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To Our Consumers:

This year the Foreign Broadcast Information Service observes its 50th anniversary.

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We members of the current staff of FBIS extend our thanks to consumers for their interest in FBIS products. To past staffers we extend our thanks for helping the service reach this anniversary year. At the same time, we pledge our continued commitment to providing a useful information service.



R. W. Manners
Director
Foreign Broadcast Information Service

East Europe

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BULGARIA

Groups in Opposition to Agrarian Reform

91BA0272A Sofia SVOBODEN NAROD in Bulgarian
18 Jan 91 p 4

[Article by Kosta Vasilev: "Who Is Against Farmers?"]

[Text] The discussion of the agrarian reform was a signal for the *nomenklatura* in agriculture to issue a desperate call for salvation. The campaign was made public by DUMA with the already notorious article "Leave the TKZS [labor cooperative farm] Alone Because Otherwise We Shall Once Again Turn Into Farmhands!" (No. 265 of 1990). The authors of this and other writings pretend not to have noticed the possibilities contemplated in the draft law on granting land to land-poor peasants. In addition to their basic wish to keep the TKZS, the Socialists do not lose the opportunity to mention that, allegedly, returning the land to its owners is impossible because, according to them, no one wants it.

Who are these people and why are they opposed? Above all, these are the cadres who sincerely believed in the communist ideal as they carried out collectivization. Although what happened subsequently proved horrible, it is obvious that, for purely psychological reasons, one cannot expect such people to support the opposite process, decollectivization. Most of those who oppose change, however, are members of the currently functional party and the administrative *nomenklatura* in the localities. Without having an ideological overlay, they are motivated exclusively by the guaranteed material benefits that go to those holding command positions. However, it is precisely such benefits that will disappear with the development of private farming, and therein lies the great difference between agriculture and industry.

This group also includes a substantial number of people who are closely involved with the *nomenklatura*: brigade leaders, purchasing agents, people responsible for projects, storekeepers, and all sorts of other organizers and petty chiefs who would like to preserve the status quo for clearly selfish reasons. Thanks to the positions they hold, overtly or covertly they appropriate part of the goods produced by the TKZS. Their "incomes" will also quickly dry up under private farming. Are there many such people? According to the 1987 statistical yearbook, the total number of persons employed in agriculture was 824,255. Of those, 606,848 were directly engaged in farming. This means that there was one chief for every three persons directly engaged in producing goods.

Particularly noteworthy are the intellectual cadres—agronomists, veterinarians, jurists, zoo technicians, and the corresponding midlevel specialists, who are also part of the group not directly engaged in farming and whose number, in 1987, did not exceed 21,640. These are educated people, who are perfectly familiar with the advantages of private farming. The special feature here is that some of them, because of their educational levels, are among the *nomenklatura* managers, and some are

also active party members. Many fear for their jobs—that is, their incomes—for which reason their attitude toward agrarian reform is equivocal. Actually, should the specialists have reason to be concerned? It is true that, in their cases, the future will be different from the present. What matters most, however, is that the work of the specialists will become entirely worthy of their training, and prestigious.

In my view, such considerations provide a relatively accurate answer to the question of why precisely it is still possible in the villages to organize an opposition to the reforms the country needs. In this case, any kind of persuasion or agitation becomes unnecessary. In simple terms, only one thing should be done: The Grand National Assembly should adopt, without delay, the type of agrarian reform that would guarantee equality of opportunity for the different forms, such as private farming, collective work, and the TKZS. In no more than two or three years, considering the present food shortages, the private farmers would simply suppress the wasteful and inefficient TKZS. This would unquestionably take place if the agrarian reform were such as to ensure not simply a return of the land to the peasants but also the guaranteed availability to private farmers and the TKZS, on an equal basis, of modern technical equipment, seeds, fertilizers, chemicals, and other materials.

Corruption Alleged in Antifascist Organization

91BA0256A Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian
20 Dec 90 pp 1, 3

[Article by Yonko Kalpazanov, senior scientific associate: "Active Fighters—Illusions and Deceits"]

[Text] Recently, steps were taken to reduce some of the privileges of the active fighters against fascism and capitalism. However, this does not fully solve the problem of putting an end to groundless privileges, both because of the resistance of the beneficiaries and because of the following:

- Not *all* privileges enjoyed by the individuals in this conventional category have been abolished. The elimination of some privileges "by the teaspoonful" leads us to guess about the other "rights" to which they are still entitled, who it is who gave them these rights, and how extensive they are, or, in general, what could we find—from free use of public baths to buying a four-room apartment for a great-grandchild without having to wait.
- The ABPK [Active Fighters Against Fascism and Capitalism] category is unclear because of the controversy as to whether or not there was fascism in Bulgaria. Furthermore, this struggle did not actually begin on 21 June 1941 and was not initiated by the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party]. Rather, it was started somewhat earlier by Dr. G.M. Dimitrov and his fellow workers, who were tried at the time

Molotov and Ribbentrop were fraternally patting each other on the shoulder.

- It is very difficult to distinguish between antifascist activities and organizational work related to the operations of the BCP or Soviet intelligence. For the former, we could accept that our state should make payments, whereas, for the latter, both the BCP and the USSR should.
- Finally, something else that is being somewhat ignored: The large number of active fighters today makes one doubt that many of them were not even close to any resistance work between 1941 and 1944.

The present number of active fighters is assessed at approximately 32,000. Assuming that their death rate was the same as that of the rest of the Bulgarian population (10.1 per thousand for the 1945-89 period), in 1945 the number should have exceeded 50,000. We have no official data confirming or refuting this figure. However, it seems to me to be highly inflated, for the following reasons:

The partisans who operated in the 12 VOZ [Insurrectional Zone of Operations] were organized in different size units. However, even on the basis of a most generous assessment, their total number could not have exceeded 2,500. In 1944, the Chavdar Brigade numbered 437 persons; between 1941 and 1944, there were 85 partisans and clandestines in the six okoliyas in Shumen Okrug; in Varna Okrug, which numbered at that time 470,000 persons, there were 198 partisans; in 1943, the Gabrovo-Sevlievo Detachment numbered 75 persons; in 1944, it numbered 38, and so forth. Participation in the partisan movement is relatively unquestionable, and an increase in the number of active fighters may be due exclusively to people who joined it in the final days preceding 9 September 1944. It is worth considering, however, whether someone who took up arms one day before the seizure of power should be granted such rights, once the Soviet Army had entered our territory.

As for guerrilla supporters, it could be assumed that their number was approximately equal to that of the partisans. In his *Antifashistkata Borba vuv Varnenski Okrug* [The Antifascist Struggle in Varna Okrug], K. Stoyanov lists the number of partisans as 198, and regular partisan supporters as 183. Even if we were to accept that every partisan had three helpers, the overall number of partisans and partisan helpers would total some 10,000. Naturally, this is assuming that we do not count as helpers of the partisan movement any peasant who, with shaking hands, gave a little bag with bread and cheese to an armed person who passed by, or a university student who attended a semiclandestine circle on a couple of occasions. Nor should we qualify as antifascist fighters all those who cursed the government in the taverns. If we generously add as many inmates of concentration camps and political prisoners and legal "cultural workers" such as Todor Pavlov, the total would be some 20,000 active fighters in 1941-44.

We speak of tens of thousands of victims of and participants in the resistance. Actually, the number of those who were killed between 1923 and 1944 was about 4,200, and partisans and partisan helpers who were killed between 1941 and 1944 totaled 1,124 (according to Historian L. Kozarov). The number of killed partisans for whose heads the then authorities paid 50,000 leva each was 567 (*Istoriya na Bulgaria* [History of Bulgaria]). The seizure of power on 9 September 1944 was the work of a group of officers, both reserve and active, supporters of D. Velchev, with the benevolent nonintervention of War Minister Iv. Marinov, and the role of the Shopi Partisan Detachment reads like the history of a satirical journal. The Gonda Voda and Enik'oy Concentration Camps had a capacity of several hundred people. Between 1941 and 1944, 1,570 persons were sentenced to death (*Istoriya na Bulgaria*), and 200 were executed.

Generally speaking, the laudatory speculations concerning the activities of our resistance and the number of its victims are ridiculous. I know that this will hurt the feelings of many honest, pure, and sincere people among the ABPK. However, this is no reason to close our eyes to the facts. The demythologization of the resistance should be carried out to its conclusion, so that we can end the shameful dividing of the Bulgarian people into "active" and "passive." The feudal caste of the fictitious fighters was formed administratively some time in the period 1959-60. When documents were unavailable but the person was "one of ours," his participation in the resistance could be proved with witness testimony. This, too, was an open secret. Many people made use of this opportunity to settle relatives along the public trough.

Pensions and free medicines per active fighter amount to some 2,903 leva. Add to this 200 leva in transportation benefits, and we have a total of 3,103 leva annually. Therefore, between 1960 and 1990, there were some 1,160,120 man-years of active fighters. Multiplied by the average annual expenditures per person, the total is 3.6 billion leva.

I proved that on 9 September 1944 the active fighters did not exceed 20,000. Considering that the present number is 32,000, at that time there should have been more than 50,000. My conclusion, therefore, is that three-fifths of the amount—that is, 2.2 billion leva—should be returned to the state. This is a minimal assessment because it is based exclusively on three privileges: pension, free medicine, and transportation.

We must begin by totally and immediately abolishing all ABPK privileges. This should be followed by a strict review of the cases. Should fraud be proved in the use of privileges, the full strictness of the law should be applied.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Role for Party of Democratic Socialism Defined

91CH0327A Bratislava NOVE SLOVO in Slovak
17 Jan 91 p 15

[Article by Ivan Svitak: "Key Questions; With Christ or With Marx?"]

[Text] "No great steps are possible, because parties are getting in each other's way...the door must be opened to citizens' political initiatives. I am therefore in favor of nationwide plebiscites. If we allow a situation to exist where political parties can checkmate each other and at the same time allow them to retain all the power, then we shall have a stalemate which will engender great dissatisfaction among the citizenry." Peter Glotz, "taz" [as published], 7 November 1989.

As the situation the CSRF now stands, plebiscites on fundamental issues could be helpful because the parties have successfully avoided them in their election campaigns. The stalemate is here and a catastrophe is now approaching, which we can euphemistically call the great privatization. And without the euphemism, a project for pilfering the national wealth, which is to create a new post-White Mountain foreign aristocracy, without a shot being fired. True, the Czechs did not lose the Battle of the White Mountain, that battle was lost by us, the Moravians. The Czechs ran away before the battle started, led by a foreign chancellor, Christian von Anhalt, while the Winter King was enjoying a feast with the envoy from England. The Moravian nobleman Karel of Zerotin repeatedly warned the Czech nobles, beginning in 1606, of the danger of their shortsightedness. I believe he was the first one who warned against Prague centrism, but he was not the last one. Now all kinds of less-than-noble Czechs want to appropriate for themselves the leading political movement, the Civic Forum. The only problem is, we shall not allow this democratic movement to pass into those rightist hands without a fight. Perhaps our backs are up against the wall, but we shall not surrender, because our Moravian White Mountain tradition does not agree with the traditional Czech defeatism.

The claim to appropriate the Civic Forum, a modern democratic movement, for the benefit of the leading role of a rightist minority of apparatchiks of this nonparty, puts us face to face with the key problem of the meaning of our history. To formulate three key questions, derived from this chronic problem which will predetermine our future for the next several decades, is easy. But it is extremely difficult to answer them, because the state monopoly on information systematically makes it impossible to present nongovernmental alternatives. When arguments fail, there follows an extensive smear campaign against everyone who presents alternatives to the government positions. The scandals go truly according to the alphabet—Adamec, Bartoncik, Barta, Battek, in the council there is Calfa, Dubcek, Dienstbier. At this time, the media are doing everything they can to preserve the monopoly of the state on truth and to systematically bury all alternative views. The academic community must not tolerate uncritical thinking. Dialectics as a clash of ideas was not invented by Marx; but by Socrates.

The key questions formulated in the spirit of our tradition of searching for the meaning of history are: What kind of revolution took place? What kind of reform

awaits us? Which is the the road leading to Europe? These are only various aspects of that certain historical process which can be understood as an international, European, or global rise of democracy, as an intellectual, economic, or political phenomenon, or as a state, cultural, or national specificity, but it always comes down to the same thing. We are asking whether the collapse of the Stalinist system coincides with the goal of the velvet revolution, or rather with a change of personalities and continuity of the old system. We are at a loss about what to celebrate and what not to celebrate. For the second time, we are asking what the meaning of the reform is, whether reprivatization will make possible not only private, but also cooperative and self-governing ownership of national property, in other words, whether the reform will be democratic or bureaucratic. The third key question, which has been urged on us as a solution by almost all the political parties, is a modest question indeed, namely which is the road to Europe that can be negotiated by a neutral country like ours. And, of course, His Highness the Czech, who refuses to give up his parochial thinking, because he and he alone who has been, is, and will remain the model of Europeanism, has decided that Europe must follow him, and if it, to its detriment, refuses to do so, let it stay cut off from him.

What Kind of Revolution?

The collapse of the Soviet system in Central Europe was and is part of a global game of the superpowers, in which one superpower exchanged its domination for a promise of economic assistance. If we understand these global determinations of Central European development, then the very concept of the revolutions is problematic, because in the true sense of the word what happened was only a change of personalities, not structural changes that would abolish the system itself. There has been no decision about the changes as yet, but they have to come. The only undisputed point is that the change of personalities and free elections are a positive milestone in the development of these societies. They are perhaps also the initial phase of a democratic revolution which will also modernize the economic system and cultural thinking. But it is also possible that the waves of rightist populism—on the rise everywhere as well as here—will bring the promising developments to a halt. Simply put: A democratic revolution is ahead of us, not behind us. There is no going back. The peculiarity of the Central European "revolutions" is the fact that they were not the result of domestic national movements—with the exception of Poland—or a surprising consequence of the global situation in which the USSR surprisingly gave up its domains. We do not underestimate this reality because the willingness to sacrifice oneself for November's improvised goals is as low as the dissatisfaction at all levels with the economic consequences is high. The undisputed benefits, travel and civil liberties, quickly became commonplace, even though they are outstanding successes and true milestones in our history.

After only one year the democratic movement of the original Civic Forum faces the necessity to define more

clearly its goal to constitute itself as a leftist party that would defend the interests of hired labor and the intelligentsia. The basis of this movement will be the principles of the Second International, and not the ideas of the apparatchiks of the Czechoslovak Social Democracy. How the talks between Revival, the left wing of the Civic Forum (Zeman, Battek, Uhl), the Social Democrats, and other groups will develop—that is unclear for the time being. What is certain is that there is now a unique opportunity for the ideas of social democracy to become the backbone of the democratic movement that we knew as the Civic Forum. The crucial point is that the left has the personalities able to weld together various streams into a modern political party, which will gather around pragmatic politics even ideologically different groups of reformed communists, ex-communists, today's socialists and democrats, so that the new "Party of Labor" can defend the interests of the working people, rely on trade unions, and not be concerned whether its members want to go forth into the future with Christ or with Marx. A modern democratic party of this kind must be tolerant toward both its wings, must create opportunities for civic initiatives, and must not make a fatal mistake to start with—think that the apparatus of the parties represent the will of the people. This leftist party must know where and for what it stands, it cannot have one foot in the government and the other in the opposition and endorse a return to capitalism, because then it would lose its *raison d'être*, its justification for existence. The party can evade the ideological question as to whether it follows socialist goals or not, but it cannot evade the most difficult problem—the Communists.

There are strategic, tactical, as well as personal aspects on the basis of which we must decide whether we should consider Communists as possible allies and partners of the left. From the strategic point of view, inasmuch as the Communists gave up their claim to the leading role and their parties ceased to be the backbone of bureaucratic dictatorships, it is in the interest of Czechoslovak democracy not to exclude almost 2 million former members from participation in the shaping of public life. All successful Western socialist parties are trying to help neutralize the influence of Stalinism in communist parties, absorb the electoral strength of the Communists by making certain concessions, and nobody even thinks about excluding them from the left. Our situation is certainly different, but the road to Europe demands a similar—not an identical—attempt to absorb those Communists who are willing to support democratic socialism. This method proved successful as a realistic road to power in France, Italy, Spain, and Greece. Keeping in mind this strategic experience, which in no way compromised the democratic character of Western socialists, Western social democrats came to power by creating governments of the left center, ensuring for themselves the support of the middle class. It is possible and necessary to do the very same thing in the CSFR, and therefore at issue is nothing less than replacing in the

1992 elections the present rightist government with a government of the left center with a socialist president at its head.

Revival of Political Democratic Left Assumed

*91CH0345A Bratislava LITERARNY TYZDENNIK
in Slovak 18 Jan 91 p 10*

[Article by Ivan Svitak: "The Left in Crisis"]

[Text] I would very much like to assist in constituting our democratic Left which would balance the Right and which would make our political spectrum normal. I build on that which is referred to as "social democracy." These are the principles of the Second International, where the democratic character of socialism was not invested with problems. If you pronounce the word socialism in our country, then many people will shake their heads. For them, socialism is Soviet communism and nothing else. This is an ingrained fact and such a miserable fact that no one wants to even speak or think about any other socialism anymore because it appears to be unattractive. However, as soon as we apply the real viewpoints of modern Europe, we see that socialism continues to live there and will thrive rather than weaken. Parties of democratic socialism can include people who find motivation in Marx for their interests in social problems, but also people who follow the religious method. Social democracy is not tied to Marx, but Marx is a focal point for it because social democrats understand the giant historical contribution which Marx made to the worker movement.

Social democracy as an idea rather than an organized party will play a more important role in this country. It would not be good for the social difficulties which are knocking at our door to become the domain of those political forces in whom the majority of the population do not have confidence. Despite the fact that I am building on social democracy, I nevertheless think that we cannot overlook the simple fact that two million people were members of the Communist Party prior to 17 November. The majority of them were clearly people who worked, went below ground in mines, miners, factory workers, clerks, and the intelligentsia. I do not like the idea of excluding these two million people from political life. This dangerous orientation would threaten the democratic character of the state. Naturally, it would be theoretically possible to deprive communists of their civil rights, but such aggressive anticommunism is very cheap.

If someone is lying on the ground, we do not kick him in the head; we either help him or we run away—even the boxing ring has its rules. In the ring, we can box, but we cannot kick our opponent below the belt. Certain rules of the game exist and cannot be violated on any basis if the struggle is to remain civilized and if it is not to threaten democracy. Despite the fact that I do not sympathize with the notion that the role of the Left should be played only by the Communist Party, I nevertheless believe that

the Communists will solve their problem. These two million people today have a very strong feeling of guilt for past problems and it is wise to let them develop and not make them constantly stand in the corner, it is wise to show them a way out. This is very important if we want to extricate the whole cart of the state establishment and begin to organize it in a more intelligent manner. Looking for culprits and name-calling in the press only complicate our way. I back the democratic Left, but I would be happiest if this democratic Left were to be fashioned by Civic Forum, by the organization which enjoys the greatest confidence. No one will accuse Civic Forum of sympathizing with communism, but the Civic Forum Left must realize that it is not a private entrepreneur and must figure out where it actually belongs. If the Civic Forum Left were to become independent, I would be happy to support it. If it fails to do so, the crisis will continue for a few more months until social democracy proves capable of once more functioning as a leftist party which must gain support in the trade unions and in leftist groupings. Without a stronger democratic Left, our democracy will remain in permanent crisis.

Politics is nothing other than an attempt to get us to react to the impetus of history being played out, rather than reacting to history which has already occurred. If we react only to that which has already happened, we have completely missed the point. Even if this approach might be ideologically to our liking and if it were to respond to, say, the spirit of the nation. It continues to be the wrong approach. People who are successful in politics are generally those who are able to dismantle myths, such as Masaryk. He was a dangerous leftist when he ran for office from North Moravian towns. At that time, my old father, who lived at Koprivnice, saved some pamphlets aimed against T.G. Masaryk, in which he was being characterized as a dangerous heathen. The clerical Right protested strongly against him. Now, the actions of the Left are once more a central question for us.

I believe that the Left has enormous opportunities. All of you were alive during the normalization period and have a pessimistic viewpoint, just like I do. But I, in turn, do not have your inhibitions so that I can have an optimistic view of the developments in Czechoslovakia. I am not burdened by feelings of responsibility and guilt. When I say that, people sort of straighten up, something which is particularly needed at this time. To not allow yourself to be depressed by a feeling of disaster, by the given mentality, and by the simplified approach used by the Czech Kocurek. Mr. Czech always plays it in such a way as to find some kind of a culprit: One time the culprit is Benes, then Dubcek, and, in the end, the culprit will be person X because we like to pass our own guilt to someone else. And then we also have our saviors—one time it was Masaryk, then Havel, or Gottwald. But such an "explanation" cannot replace the real historic process.

The Left is not badly off, we are only in a current depression, in a state of decomposition which will very

soon come to a halt. Over the next two years, the Left will grow in strength, it will unify, but it will not do so on the basis of coalitions or personal bartering, but rather on the basis of the necessity for someone to defend the interests of the working people who have no champion. The historical process will revive the Left and what is now important is whether or not we will comprehend this and whether we shall create some kind of minimal program which will unite the Left. Today, it is no longer a question of who has how much egg on their face (some have more, some have less), but it is rather a question of what kind of social forces will be capable of reacting to the situation which will develop. This situation will be highly explosive and will be worse than we think. Our opportunity is unequivocal because the need to find those responsible and to explain the current crisis by referring to the past is evaporating. You can look for culprits for six months or a year, but in a few months it will no longer be of interest to people because they will be reacting to the real situation and not to history. I am an optimist when it comes to future elections.

The important thing which the Left must do is to admit its opposition character. I am unable to accurately predict the extent to which this should or should not be done, because I do not know my way about in either personal or political groupings. But one thing I know with absolute certainty: We need not justify the fact that we belong to the Left and we need to begin talking about it. I have no idea whether this is ideologically advantageous, but I find it repugnant when people wish to practice leftist politics and, at the same time, they wish to be part of the government. With one foot we are in the government and with the other against it: With one foot we are for unemployment and we rejoice about how great it is that we have shutdown programs, and on the other hand.... That just cannot be. Either we are for developmental programs or for shutdown programs, for an economy which will make us into a banana republic, as nicely stated by Harvard professor Jeffry Sachs in the case of Poland. Banana republics in Latin America cannot be defended here, but he selected Poland and, from the beginning, Poland has a national income which is one-third lower than it was. If we apply these methods to our country, we shall be transformed into a banana republic.

The Left must say a specific "no." I would be happy if I were to hear someone say that any amount of unemployment is unacceptable, that the goals of the government are not our goals and are not compatible with what we consider to be the future. And if we must repeat this one hundred times, then we shall repeat it one hundred times. There are many alternatives to the government program—Professor Matejka wrote on this with great sensibility—and a whole series of economists realize this. But the view is arising that you are either for the restoration of capitalism, as invented by the government, or you are an enemy of the state. This is a dangerous matter and we must reject it and unilaterally state that the restoration of capitalism is a variation

fraught with problems and need not be generally accepted. During these elections, the pinnacle of programming was the lack of programming so that anyone who had no program at all won everything. The Left can no longer conceal its oppositional character or be afraid to formulate an alternative program.

We must create a minimum program. We cannot come together as parties or groups or individuals, but we must clearly state that, in 1992, we want to win the elections and that we want a socialist for president and premier. Let us not be afraid to so state. These program ideas form the basis for long-range perspectives. What do we wish to achieve in these two years? This is very important and I believe that we shall succeed in achieving a left-of-center government. Right now, we have a government of the Right which wishes to evoke the impression that it is a left-right-center government. Experiences recorded by Western socialists show that those socialists, for example, the Mitterands, who capture the central stratum, govern and remain in power for longer periods of time. We are capable of doing the same precisely because the tension within Civic Forum will inevitably result in its breakup; we can observe this inevitability on a daily basis in the developments taking place in Poland. If we end up having the confidence of the people and the program, we shall extricate ourselves from the narcosis, which is understandable and possibly even necessary. It will last for approximately six months or longer, but I have the feeling that we are already beginning to awaken from it.

Finally, a last thought which appears to be decisive to me. In our country, the idea of socialism today is so overly vulgarized that if you want to come out as a socialist or in the name of socialism, everyone will laugh at you. You will surely recognize the reasons for this very well. It does not matter; in America, you can also not agitate using socialism. But here, there is a still greater antisocialist mood than that which exists in the rightist circles of rightist America. Our people identify Soviet-style communism (real socialism) with democratic socialism. This problem does not exist in the West. These conceptual differences will be strengthened as soon as the Soviet Union ceases being a bogeyman. Socialism will become stronger, not weaker. Once we have extricated ourselves in this country from the trauma of enthusiasm, those emotions which control us today will cease to have an effect. These emotions have always moved us throughout history: from the East to the West and from the West to the East, "with the faults of both, but not with their strengths," as said by Machar. We suffer from a combination of French excitement and Russian fog. Right now, we are exciting ourselves in the French manner and we are waiting for the Russian fog to once more descend upon us.

Once we extricate ourselves from the oscillations of the emotional pendulum, we shall begin using rational attitudes. These will not compel us to engage in any kind of philosophy, but rather will compel a reality: As soon as people see that prices will rise by 20 percent and the

dollar will appreciate sharply, they will be more accessible for the ideas of the Left. They will understand what is at stake; that capitalism with a human faith does not exist, but that we would like to believe that it does. However, there is no such thing as a "healthy nucleus of bankers" who would rush to our side, desiring to heap Western capital upon us. Not at all; they will not give a rap for us, they will not be testing their financial vehicles in our country. Elementary realism, the substantive perception of facts, the reaction to these facts as well as the common sense of the people will amount to what can be called the Left (a democratic or a socialist Left). Our future is generally quite decent; the Left has not been counted out. In the history of the socialist movement, there have been worse crises than that which we are going through now. As long as the given mechanism exists in the industrial societies, as long as the process exists by which man who stands alongside the assembly line can be condemned, that is as long as the problem of the emptiness of industrial civilization will persist, an emptiness which afflicts people particularly when their needs have been satisfied. It will afflict them precisely at the time they perceive the nakedness of capitalism. It is precisely at that time that people turn to religion, to some kind of cult, to drugs, or to sex. These same problems will also come into being in this country. And people will once more be attracted by the old idea of socialism, which you can see also in humanism or in early Christianity—in the idea of man's participation in the suffering of another. Under socialism, this is not a question of production or consumption, what is involved are people. This is the most important card and one which should be played.

The economic reform is also a reform of producers. The question is whether producers will have some kind of self-administrative mechanism at their disposal which will make it possible for them to control production? This is the great idea of socialism which was defended by the self-administration Communists and anarchists in the Great October Revolution. We know how it ended. If we begin to talk out loud about the idea of self-administration, economic self-administration (economic democracy), people will react positively. The people want economic democracy not capitalism.

Pithart on Ideology, Federation, Current Issues

91CH0344A Bratislava LITERARNY TYZDENNIK
in Czech and Slovak 14 Dec 90 p 13

[Interview with Premier of the Czech Republic Petr Pithart by Lubos Sveton on 5 December 1990; place not given: "Ideological Ennui"]

[Text] [Sveton] Sir Winston Churchill is the author of many memorable thoughts on democracy. One of them is: "A democracy is the necessity to occasionally bow to the views of other people." Can you tell us what is your personal concept of democracy in our state; should it be an analogue of Western ones, or something new and specific? Most Western philosophers expect from the

former East European socialist countries new ideas at the very least... Will the CSFR provide them with any?

[Pithart] I do not think that we should strive for some special philosophy of our democracy. There has been more than enough of a particularly Czech messianism. The principles of democracy, similarly to the principles of a reasonable lifestyle, are basically one and the same. I do not think that we should copy some Western model, or try to design some specific model at all costs. We are simply striving for democracy. We shall succeed to some degree and fail to some degree. And what we shall look like will depend on how much we achieve. I confess that I do not know what ideas Western philosophers expect from us. I only know that all true democrats, no matter where they come from, would sigh a sigh of relief if we succeed in building a decent democracy. I do not know whether we are giving them cause for satisfaction....

[Sveton] In your interview for the Slovak government daily NARODNI OBRODA on 3 August, you also stated: "...and those who thought that after November people will behave in an entirely different way were probably naive idealists...." Do you not think that the inertia of behavior is caused only by stereotypes and deep-rooted habits? How can a Premier contribute in a specific way to a change in the spirit of education, of morality.... Did you not notice that citizens are changing a little bit, after all—they are beginning to favor commercial success more, they see in the Western style of living mainly economic well-being? Or, in a different way, the cultural level of a nation can be measured by something more difficult than its material wealth—is that not where the problem lies?

[Pithart] Certainly. Stereotypes, deeply ingrained habits and bad habits. But not just that. Some necessary structures within the society and individual attitudes were not created. I am, of course, basing my assessment on my experiences with the Czech milieu, but I do not think that in this respect the Slovak milieu would be much different. Because the totalitarian dictatorship destroyed the traditional society and in its place created its own monstrosity, we lack certain social structures. For example, open groups where people communicate openly. We were actually composed of closed groups and isolated individuals. For a time we were united in our mass enthusiasm a year ago. But now, when concerns and fears are weighing on us, everybody is alone with them again. That is a handicap, because the creation of democratic institutions requires a more open communication not only in the parliament but most of all "below." And as far as individual people are concerned, we all learned to be passive and dependent. Even today, many people expect that problems will be resolved mainly "from above," that the governments will take care of them. There are still too few people "below" with initiative and ideas. You are saying that people are changing after all, that they are beginning to favor commercial success. I think that a consumer mentality was prevalent even during the old regime. Just remember how corruption grew during the past 20 years. I think

that preference for consumerism is not caused by the fact that consumption is more easily measured than culture, but because it is more comfortable. Culture is always something that is demanding, disquieting, unsettling....

[Sveton] In many people's minds the words of Mr. Vladimir Meciar echo about the kangaroo who is jumping ahead with an empty pouch. If we apply the kangaroo simile to the sphere of private entrepreneurship, do you not agree that often at this time only those who were able to fill their pouches well in the past succeed. Moreover, in their chase after profits they usually do not concern themselves with ecology and the preservation and promotion of cultural values. Are the prospects therefore that the rich will become richer still, the poor will remain poor, that in the devastation of the environment we shall go a step further in the name of the goal's sanctity, and inexpensive, popularly priced, art will be only kitsch and "sensational art"?

[Pithart] I am afraid of that, of course. Everything has to be paid for, and the road to freedom is not easy. At issue is whether we shall be able to create democratic conditions. Democracy, after all, is not just market economy and free prices, but also binding rules of the game—the rule of law. In other words, not only the freedom of enterprise, but also social policy, cultural policy, ecological policy, etc. That is why we are electing deputies to the parliament and local governments, so that they will make the rules and see to it that they are respected, and create new ones according to need. Democracy after all does not mean fatalism. Democratic rules must be designed in such a way that decency pays, or, at the very least, that impropriety does not pay. But let us not have any great illusions: Democracy, like justice, must in its own way be blind. Everyone can be happy or unhappy in his own way.

[Sveton] You are one of the few politicians at the republic level of our federation who "managed" to stay in the same function even after the June elections. Is that, in your opinion, an expression of trust the Czech nation has in your position on the question of the structure of our federation?

[Pithart] My present function was entrusted to me by the Czech Council. I am not so bold as to assess the trust of my nation. That will become clear at the end of the election period at the latest. And as far as the concept of the structure of the federation is concerned? You are certainly aware that among the Czechs this subject is quite controversial. On this point my position is the weakest: Many people here identify "Czech" with "federal" and they do not understand why I cannot go along with it.

[Sveton] In 1980 you published a critical study "Sixty-Eight" under the pseudonym J. Sladecik. In it you analyzed the processes that led to the Prague Spring and later to its failure. But you also wrote in this book: "If we, Czechs, understood the Slovaks better, we would also understand ourselves better. It so happens that in reality

we needed them more than they needed us. After all, in summer the concept of a Czech state (CSR) and Czech politics caused us open embarrassment. We did not know what to do about it all. (...) Slovakia is here to remind us once again that it is precisely on this point that we need to review the superficial concept of our own nation, and that we must look at many of our taboo subjects through a magnifying glass...." How do you view the self-awareness of the Czech nation today? Are we to understand that one of the individualistic ways to establish identity is that memorable sentence: "Slovaks are costing us"?

[Pithart] I would put what I have written the same way today. The process of self-awareness of the Czech nation is still in its initial stage. The national consciousness in Slovakia is disproportionately livelier. I think that the Czech national consciousness must be built from "below" by restoring natural structures such as the family, community, region. I believe that the Czech society was more severely damaged than the Slovak society. It has to do with the mass transfer of Germans from our border areas, with the destructive Czech egalitarianism (Czech democracy is called "plebeian"), a deep-rooted distrust of authority, the vertical dimension of the social structure, and last but not least, Czech agnosticism. Otherwise we would not be able to avoid the risk of nationalism. It is precisely the people without roots that are liable to succumb to it. Look at our monstrous high-rise development Petrzalka. That memorable sentence "Slovaks are costing us" need not be taken as an expression of some current Czech search for self-awareness. It is actually an old saying.

[Sveton] It is as if there had been some situations in the past analogous to the present ones—in 1967-69. In Slovakia, the efforts in behalf of a Hungarian University in Komarno and the revival of the Matica, in Moravia discussions about the Moravian question are increasing.... Does it not seem to you that after 20 years of no resolutions, these problems are now exploding with a much greater intensity? Are you going to find some general formula to keep us together given these explosions?

[Pithart] I agree with you. I think that the best way would be to try and transmute these explosions into dialogue, that is, put them on a civil basis. I try to translate every basic disagreement into the language of everyday problems, to "disideologize" it. And then to transfer such disagreements from the level of declarations of principles to the level of personal discussions: people always have an easier time coming to an agreement than do principles.

[Sveton] When you are trying to structure the federation practically from scratch, even concepts take on new meanings. Do you have in mind that in this new relationship the republic sovereignty would also mean the supremacy of republic laws over the federation laws? What do you think about the almost heretical idea that a

broad and strong federation provides more free space for the individual components than a narrow and weak federation?

[Pithart] Given a careful and forward-looking determination of jurisdictions there should be no conflicts between the laws of the republics and the laws of the federation. Both will have their established area of validity and applicability. The laws of the republics cannot supersede the laws of the federation; but those will have to be designed in such a way that they express the will of the republics. This method is an expression of the will to "agree that we shall agree." And as far as the heretical idea, as you called it, is concerned, it depends above all on the fundamental intentions of the individual components of the federation or confederation, be they states, republics, regions, cantons, or other. It depends on whether they are interested in creating a common union or in disengaging themselves from the common union. A "strong" federation, to my mind, is not strong by virtue of its jurisdictions, but because the individual components of the federation feel secure and free in it, because they have an interest in its existence. That is not only a matter of constitutions and jurisdictions, but of the general atmosphere in the country. Otherwise, of course, there is a problem with those adjectives. At one time we all said "strong republics—strong federation." It was criticized, and rightly so, because it was a slogan and thus something imprecise. I am afraid that other word combinations could be similarly attacked, such as, for example, "broad federation" or "narrow confederation." I simply think that a viable and prospering federation is a federation that consists of such republics, lands, cantons, etc., that are spontaneously in favor of such a federation and can maintain their individuality within its framework. A federation consisting of members that enter into it (or stay in it) reluctantly is not very viable.

[Sveton] Would you characterize the society under the former totalitarian regime as civil or uncivil? Did pseudocivility cover up the just revealed unwillingness to help others, such as by donating blood? Does not compassion diminish as fears and worries increase? How do you explain the overcrowded psychiatric care centers? You certainly must have your own assessment of the contribution of amnesty to the psychological stability of society....

[Pithart] This is a lot of questions all at once. Under the former totalitarian regime the society as a whole was condemned to being uncivil. Fear and worries are enemies of compassion. The amnesty that was too broad did not contribute to the psychological stability of society. I am not certain that psychiatric care centres are overcrowded. But if they are, then it would probably be the result of other factors as well. Maybe even the lack of imported medications; I do not know. Freedom is a burden and many of us are unable to carry it. Even that is a price which we are paying for freedom.

[Sveton] People say that if you do not do anything, you do not make mistakes. Which mistakes are you afraid of the most? What nightmares are encroaching on your sleep?

[Pithart] You are obviously thinking about my own mistakes. What can happen to me is what can happen to any politician. Everyone can make a misjudgment, a one-sided assessment, bet on something that does not work out, overlook an important symptom. And nightmares? I happen to sleep very well, but I do worry sometimes. For example, about the possibility of lack of understanding between the Czechs and the Slovaks.

[Sveton] It can be said that the antithesis of responsibility is irresponsibility. Does it not seem to you that irresponsibility and unwillingness to answer questions are not so far apart, at least in politics?

[Pithart] Yes, not to answer questions is irresponsible. But I must add: well formulated questions. We lost the ability to ask good questions. Often, the way we ask a question already contains within it the answer: We express our own position more than an interest in how the other person views the issue. We are afraid to ask questions the answer to which could cast doubt on our concept of the world, that is, the concept we have of ourselves. Half the kingdom for a good question! Mostly—for example, at press conferences—I wait in vain for a good question. Or in other words, responsibility rests also with those who ask, not only with those who respond.

[Sveton] In his time Nietzsche maintained that "madness in an individual is something rare, but a madness of nations and epochs is a rule." Are you not afraid of epochs of madness and nations driven to madness in the future?

[Pithart] Of course I am. It is enough just to look around the world. But I am also hopeful: The world is already tired of ideologies. Simplistic answers which lead to mass madness are becoming more and more suspect. Such answers are demanded only by people who are desperate, isolated, cornered. The madness of nations is the madness of lonely people who cannot satisfy their need to specifically belong somewhere. They then belong directly—in an abstract way—to the nation. They leave out all the intermediate identities and loyalties (to their neighbors, to their corner of the village, to the community, to colleagues at work, to their parish, their region) and they belong totally and exclusively to the exciting "nation" which, however, is only an abstract fiction under such circumstances.

Definition of Official Language in Law Criticized

91CH0343A Bratislava LITERARNY TYZDENNIK
in Slovak 14 Dec 90 p 12

[Article by Nora Krausova: "The World of Words—Is the Text of the Law on the 'Official Language' Logically Correct?"]

[Text] Even if there were no other reason, there is one and it is definitely not political, on account of which it is impossible to agree with the text of the already enacted proposal of the law covering the "official language." The reason is Section 5 and its feedback with respect to the text of the preceding sections. Section 5 states: "Concern for the Official Language. The state is responsible for scientific research and for improving the culture and purity of the official language."

It is not necessary to be a philologist or a stylist for a person to know (for example, at the level of a college graduate) that the concept of an "official language" is not identical with the concept of the "Slovak language," but rather that it designates that area, that specific specialized style of language, any kind of cultural language, and not only that which is used in the "European house." "Official language" is part of the so-called functional linguistic styles ("functional languages" according to Hausenblas), and is part of the group of styles which we call "specialized" ("scientific"), in contrast to literary, spoken, and artistic styles (languages). This division is generally recognized, no matter how the "specialized language" is referred to and makes a separation into major and minor numbers of classes or styles. To comprehend this fact, it is sufficient to have common sense, which should, however, not be burdened by equally well-known "passions." The importance of the concept of the "Slovak language" cannot be narrowed down to the term "official language," because it should be clear to everyone (for example, to the delegates to the Slovak National Council) that the "official language" has certain specific characteristics, which means specific stylistic limitations and characteristics which are not inherent in the standard, spoken, or literary language which people use for mutual communication and which are certainly not present in the language of artistic literature ("poetic language"), because it is no longer a question of communication, but rather primarily a question of esthetic effect.

If the characteristics of specialized language (style), which also include the "official language," are accuracy, explicitness, logic, constancy, systematicity, semantic lucidity, internationality, and others (as we can find out by reading any stylistic manual), then it is simultaneously clear to us that these characteristics cannot be inherent, for example, in the spoken language, and thus, much less, in artistic language (which, in contrast, has the opposite characteristics: multiplicity, suggestiveness, novelty, uncommonness, etc.).

And so, we believe, it sounds comical for the legislators to make efforts to be concerned about the "scientific research" and all kinds of improvements ("culture and purity") of the "official language." In this case, scientific research is redundant, if not unnecessary, because we know how the official language should be: The ideal for this language is primarily its stability, one could even speak of a certain ossification, and not the creative innovation of, for example, the artistic language, research of which is virtually dependent upon support

from the state. Scientific research should be applied to all of the literary language, including all of its functional styles, and not so much to its "purity" (after all, not even the greatest of philologists accepts this concept), but rather to its "culture" which some of those who show concern regarding the text of this law were clearly lacking. Moreover, the formulation covering "improvements in purity" can conceal more intralingual intolerance, purism, and national aggression, much like the incriminated formulation of "without exception" appearing in the original proposal.

And so we do not have a law on language, but rather a law on a certain linguistic style: a law on the official language, proceeding along the lines of the well-known poetic trick to which old (as well as more recent) rhetoricians refer as "synecdoche," or the euphemistic representation of the whole by one of its parts. In literature, and in art in general, this is basically a permissible and legal process: But is it also the case with respect to the language in which laws are to be formulated—in other words, in regard to the official language?

I admit that I do not like the slogan regarding entry into, or return to, Europe, which is sponging off this law, but rather that I am beginning slowly to become allergic to it and that I am beginning to feel a virtual sense of idiosyncrasy with regard to this unattainable tempting European house, which has been placed on a pedestal and which appears before us in the twilight somewhere like a foggy image. In order to be rid of this intellectual and certainly nationalistic complex, I shall make use of a drastic cure: I shall repeat the national cliche in accordance with the example set by the great as well as the small: A nation which has nothing behind it other than a hyphen (Milos Zeman) and is confronted with such an incorrect law regarding language will hardly be able to return to Europe.

However, someone could object that they are not interested in the meaning of the term "official language," and that they wish to perceive it in the manner in which it is used in the law, in other words, in the narrowed synecdochic sense of the word. However, the situation is not quite so simple. To define the importance of such a concept which is so frequently used in not only European cultural systems is not a matter solely for Slovak linguistics, stylistics, or jurisdiction, but, at the very least is a matter for all of Europe and involves the separation of language into functional languages or functional linguistic styles which are currently and naturally in use. The characteristics of official language which have been identified are equally valid for the German language, for French, for Polish, for English, and for other languages, in other words, for languages of nations having similar cultural systems and structures.

For those few Slovak intellectuals who always believe—during the period of normalization, as well as today—that they must stand in the first ranks, irrespective of the activities involved, I would quote the end of my article entitled "The Need for Tolerance," which appeared in

one of the last issues of LITERARNY TYZDENNIK in 1989, "with immodesty and in bad taste." Even today, a certain "moral imperative" applies, as pronounced by Max Weber: "That there is a certain virtue which can be demanded from a professional intellectual, it is a duty which he must constantly bear in mind to always keep a cool head with respect to his personal authority in the face of any kind of ideals and, when necessary, to swim against the current." Despite the fact that the personal credo or program of "swimming against the current" did not result in any kind of recognition or advantage for me over the past 20 years (almost to the contrary), I never doubted the words of Max Weber and, as the current situation teaches me, will not ever doubt them.

POLAND

POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup: 29 Dec-5 Jan

91EP0231A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 1,
5 Jan 91 p 2

[Excerpts]

National News

[passage omitted]

The Sejm adopted a law on taxes for wage increases, the so-called taxes on wage increases exceeding standards. According to the new, less severe law, private firms and privatized firms (ones in which the state holds less than 50 percent), some cooperatives (housing, physical persons, some physical persons in partnership with legal persons), and joint ventures formed prior to 1 January 1991 will not pay the tax.

The prices of Ursus tractors have increased by 11 to 15 percent or about 5 million zlotys. For example, the C-330 now costs 39.6 million zloty. The price of the Fiat 126p has also increased. The standard version now costs 26 million zloty; the B version costs 32 million zloty.
[passage omitted]

ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE reports predictions for price and wage increases from December 1990 to February 1991. According to Prof. W. Welfe prices will increase by 5.7 and 5 percent. Wages will be 1.52 million, 1.6 million, and 1.76 million zlotys. According to Dr. R. Kokoszczynski: 3.9, 10.8, and 9.8 percent, and wages: 1.55 million, 1.72 million, and 1.896 million zlotys. According to the editors of ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE the indexes will be 6, 8, and 8 percent and 1.6 million, 1.65 million, and 1.8 million zlotys. In the same issue, No. 51-52 of ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE, a lengthy sketch of the new propertied class in Poland, its ethos, customs, etc., also merits notice.

Adam Michnik in an article "General's Farewell" in GAZETA WYBORCZA writes, among other things: "Gen. Jaruzelski was a president fully loyal to the processes of democratic change. He respected the law

and the pluralist character of Polish society. Leaving the Belweder, he showed a true class that arouses respect. For these dozen or so months, the former creator of martial law has been a president loyal to a Poland seeking roads to democracy, normality, and Europe. And all of Poland should remember Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski for that."

The editors of TRYBUNA, the paper of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, have been removed from their offices in the center of the city and sent to Praga. RZECZPOSPOLITA has taken over their space. In the farewell text, titled "Move," the editors write: "We think the taking over of the place occupied TRYBUNA LUDU's editor in chief by Fikus, the head of the government paper RZECZPOSPOLITA, is understandable, such is the logic of revolution. The winner takes all." [passage omitted]

From a survey by the Public Opinion Research Center conducted for RZECZPOSPOLITA. Between 7 and 12 December 1990, public opinion on 12 selected politicians was surveyed. Favorable: Walesa, 72 percent; Mazowiecki, 70 percent; Skubiszewski, 57 percent; Jaruzelski, 54 percent; Balcerowicz, 50 percent; Michnik, 49 percent; Najder, last on the list, 16 percent. Balcerowicz received the highest unfavorable opinion, 33 percent; next was Jaruzelski, 30 percent; Skubiszewski had the least unfavorable rating, 4 percent.

Lech Walesa, president of the Republic of Poland, has officially been invited to visit Taiwan by a delegation representing the island's president, government, and parliament. The visit is to be made during the first half of 1991. A spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told GAZETA WYBORCZA that the ministry officially knows nothing about the invitation to Walesa. [passage omitted]

Beginning 1 January 1991, sales of goods and services in the Republic of Poland can be made only for Polish zlotys.

The OPZZ [All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement] has withdrawn from the World Federation of Trade Unions. Jan Bogustyn of the OPZZ council on the reasons for the decision to a reporter for TRYBUNA: "We are for cooperation with many organizations and thus withdrawing from the Federation does not mean we have broken off all contacts with it. We retain observer status, and we are continuing to participate in its activities, but from a different position." By making this decision, the OPZZ "wants to emphasize its pluralism."

Marian Podkowinski, the chairman of the Association of Journalists of the Republic of Poland, in a letter to Dr.

Kazimierz Strzyczkowski, the chairman of the Liquidation Commission for the Workers' Publishing Cooperative, in conjunction with the auction for EXPRESS WIECZORNY: "We think it would be immoral to sell the paper to a bidder who did not listen to the voice of the journalists of the paper put up for auction. It is obvious that the group of people who create each press title determine its life in the consciousness of society."

Gabriel Janowski, the chairman of NSZZ [Independent Self-Governing Trade Union] Solidarity of Individual Farmers, sent a letter to the president of radio and television expressing "disapproval and outrage" at the reports of his comments supporting Lech Walesa's presidential candidacy at times different from the one agreed upon (not mostly in regard to WIADOMOSCI but to the later ones after 2300 hours). "The question which Mr. Domaranczyk asked me when I intervened by telephone ('How many farmers do you represent?') shows most clearly the extremely crude approach to political questions and a complete lack of familiarity with the reality in which we are seeking a way toward a better future for Poland. The irresponsibility of such people, who hold key positions in the social media, considerably contributed to the tensions and misunderstandings which have developed in Poland and forced the farmers to demonstrate their power on the public roads. As is apparent not sufficiently enough." (TYGODNIK ROLNIKOW SOLIDARNOŚĆ No. 51-52) [passage omitted]

Opinions

[passage omitted]

Gen. Brigade Zdzislaw Ostrowski, plenipotentiary of the Government of the Republic of Poland for affairs associated with the stay of the Soviet Army in Poland:

(Interviewed by Jan Raszeja, GAZETA POMORSKA 19 December 1990)

[Answer] We are striving to have the last Soviet soldier leave Poland by the end of 1991. We anticipate that the peak of the transit transports from Germany will occur in 1991-93, and, therefore, we want for the Northern Group of Soviet Army Forces to leave Poland earlier. Otherwise, the number of Soviet units in Poland might temporarily increase instead of decrease.

Prof. Dr. Wieslaw Chrzanowski, president of the Christian National Union (ZChN):

(From comments for KONFRONTACJE No. 12, 1990)

"I think that Lech Walesa himself is not a man who would build a political camp. For various psychological and pragmatic reasons. He goes with a small, changing group; he wants to be above the parties, and that is not just his plan, but that is the limit of his abilities.... Lech Walesa will not introduce a quasi-dictatorial order by a certain elite. He neither wants to do it, nor can he."

POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup: 6-12 Jan

91EP0240A Warsaw *POLITYKA* in Polish No 2,
12 Jan 91 p 2

[Excerpts]

National News

[passage omitted]

A fissure has developed in the Citizens Parliamentary Club [OKP]: 74 parliamentarians have left the Club, including 29 senators, and have formed their own club Parliamentary Club of the Democratic Union [KPUD].

In the middle of December 1990, the Center for Research on Public Opinion examined the popularity of Polish politicians. Answers were collected on 24 individuals: below we publish the levels of public support for the first ten (in parenthesis the results of surveys in January and June 1990). 1. Primate Jozef Glemp, 74 (79 and 82). 2. Lech Walesa, 63 (72 and 51). 3. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, 54 (85 and 74). 4. Krzysztof Skubiszewski, 48 (previous ratings not given). 5. Wojciech Jaruzelski, 46 (32 and 28). 6. Adam Michnik, 42 (55 and 55). 7. Jacek Kuron, 40 (54 and 43). 8. Andrzej Stelmachowski, 36 (40 and 39). 9. Bronislaw Geremek, 35 (46 and 50). 10. Mikolaj Kozakiewicz, 34 (49 and 45). Of the remaining names, it is worth mentioning Leszek Balcerowicz, 31 (43 and 37) and Małgorzata Niezabitowska, 26 (61 and 40). W. Jaruzelski is the only one of those listed above whose rating rose between January and December and by 14 percent (from June by 18 percent); the percentage negative opinion of him also fell from 21 percent in January to 14 percent in December 1990. Those with the highest levels of disapproval at the end of the year were S. Tyminski (46), L. Moczulski and A. Miodowicz (32), M. Niezabitowska (29), J. Kuron (26), and L. Balcerowicz (24).

Price increases. Primarily for electricity and gas. The first by an average of 20 percent for private individuals and 15 percent for industry. Gas by an average of 80 percent, more for private individuals and 60 percent for industry. Postal rates to the former socialist countries increased by an average of 250 percent. Airplane fares to socialist countries also increased; for example, a ticket to Moscow will cost \$257 (previously 388,000 zlotys). Prices for liquid fuels also increased: a liter of 94-octane gasoline costs 4,100 zlotys (previously 3,700 zlotys). The Automobile Factory, for which it has become a habit, raised the prices of its cars: for the Polonez to 62 million zlotys (about 17 percent) and for the FSO 1500 to 52 million zlotys (by 24 percent). Prices for nearly all brands of Polish cigarettes increased: for Marsy, the most, to 3,300 zlotys from 2,700 zlotys and for Aresy to 2,800 from 2,300 zlotys; the price of Kapitany in a hard box also increased by 500 zlotys.

Reports from TRYBUNA: for the first time in 30 years, food expenses in household budgets exceeded 55 percent in 1990. In 1960, the level was 50.5 percent; in 1970, 45.7 percent; in 1980, 35.7 percent. In the middle of the

1980's, the level in the United States, TRYBUNA notes, was 15.3 percent; in Great Britain, 19.9 percent; in the FRG, 24 percent; and in Italy, 29 percent.

Living standards according to respondents worsened in 1990. A survey by the Public Opinion Research Center shows that half of those surveyed said their material situation was average; more than a third, bad; and 12 percent, good. In the opinion of 92 percent of the respondents, incomes are rising more slowly than prices. [passage omitted]

According to data from the Central Office of Statistics, for now approximate, there were 38.2 million Poles at the end of 1990. During the year our numbers increased by 153,000 (0.4 percent): 61.9 percent lived in cities. 57 percent are in their working years; about 30 percent have as yet to reach their working years; and about 13 percent have past their working years. The number of births stayed at the level of 1989 (562,000); the number of deaths increased to 385,000 (by about 4,000). The rate of natural population growth was the lowest in the postwar period (the difference between the number of births and deaths).

The most outstanding Polish politician was selected in an open-ended survey done by Public Opinion Research Center. Lech Walesa, 52 percent, decisively outdistanced the others: T. Mazowiecki, 25 percent; W. Jaruzelski, 6 percent; K. Skubiszewski, 4.1 percent; and L. Balcerowicz, 3.5 percent. Mikhail Gorbachev was chosen politician of the year in the world (28 percent). Behind him were Pope John Paul II and L. Walesa (20 percent). [passage omitted]

The Krakow voivod declared 31 March the liquidation date for the Kuznica Culture Center; the property of the center is to be taken over by the Krakow culture house, and it is to decide the fate of the current lessees, including the monthly ZDANIE. [passage omitted]

Opinions

Piotr Nowina-Konopka, secretary-general of the Democratic Union (UD):

(Interviewed by Katarzyna Kolenda, GAZETA KRAKOWSKA 19 December 1990)

[Answer] The one who provoked these moods must take responsibility for what happens in the near future. The Democratic Union has a strong sense of responsibility for the state, and the various claims will find no defenders or allies in it. Even if that were to have an influence on the future parliamentary elections. We want to be honorable to the end.

[Question] Currently, there is speculation on the membership of the future government. Are you assuming members of the Union will be in the new cabinet?

[Answer] Today the Democratic Union has no aspirations to participate in governing.

Alfred Miodowicz, chairman of the OPZZ [All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement]:

(Interviewed by Teresa Grabczynska, TYGODNIK POPULARNY 23-30 December 1990)

[Answer] I am amazed at Walesa and at how he, a union leader, can support privatization. Privatization leads to unemployment. How can you privatize an economy and also ensure people have work? That is only possible with extraordinary government effectiveness and a not so small quantity of financial resources. May it not happen that in privatizing the economy on a broad scale we give the workers an illusion of ownership, with which we have dealt and are dealing in the so-called socialized places of employment. [passage omitted]

Dr. Włodzimierz Lecki, Poznań voivode:

(Interviewed by Marian Flejsierowicz, POZNANIAK 5-6 January 1991)

[Question] Do you support a change in the local administrative subdivisions?

[Answer] Yes, because the current one is bad. The voivodships are too small. I am for restoring the old voivodships, and even for creating still larger ones. There could be as few as 12, and Poznań Voivodship would reach all the way to the Odra River and include the current Poznań, Kalisz, Konin, Leszno, and Pila Voivodships and parts of the Zielona Góra and Gorzów Wielkopolski Voivodships. Obviously, that would require the restoration of the powiaty. The gminas are, in my opinion, too small for local government fully to develop in them. [passage omitted]

POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup: 13-19 Jan

91EP0241A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 3,
19 Jan 91 p 2

[Excerpts]

National News

From a declaration by the parliament of the Republic of Poland: "The Sejm and the Senate of the Republic of Poland have received the reports coming from Wilno on the developments in the situation in Lithuania with the greatest concern.... The Sejm and the Senate of the Republic of Poland confirm their unchanging position on the right of the Lithuanians and other people to freedom.... Poland remains intensely interested in the maintenance of peace and toleration in our region. Such a condition is in the interest of all of Europe. The Sejm and Senate of the Republic of Poland consider that all disputed issues should be settled exclusively using peaceful means, in particular, through talks and negotiations between the concerned parties." [passage omitted]

The Sejm accepted the membership of the Council of Ministers presented by Premier Jan Krzysztof Bielecki and named the government. There were 272 votes for and 62 abstentions, chiefly from the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) and the Parliamentary Club of the Democratic Union.

"A Year Later and After the Shock" is the title of an article in ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE in which Grzegorz

W. Kolodko critically summarizes the year in the economy. "If the criterion for success is the degree of the realization of formally defined goals, I would have to claim the program had completely failed." The author presents the government plans for 1990: the inflation rate was to be 20 percent, but it was 100 percent. Socialized industrial production was to fall by 5 percent, but it fell by about 25 percent. The national income was to decline by 3.1 percent, but it declined by 17-18 percent. The unemployment rate was to be 2 percent, but it was 6.3 percent. The trade balance in convertible currency was to be a negative 0.8 billion, but it was a plus 4.4 billion; but in convertible currencies it was to be plus 0.5 billion but it was plus 4.2 billion. Moreover, not only were the planned goals not reached, but the results were paid for with higher than planned costs. For example, real wages fell by more than 20 percent. The conclusion: "The alternative: inflation or a shortage was replaced by the alternative: inflation or a recession plus the delayed appearance of unemployment."

Economic news from the same issue of ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE. In December 1990, industrial production (without private production) was 23.9 percent lower (per work day) than in December 1989 and 20.5 percent lower than in December 1988. The decline was particularly sharp in high-quality ceramics (44 percent), textiles (36 percent), and leather (35.1 percent). In construction, production was 4.6 percent lower, but in comparison with December 1988, it was 35.1 percent. Purchases of live slaughter animals fell over the course of the year by 27.8, and over two years by 45 percent. [passage omitted]

A quick survey by the Center Accord (2,100 random individuals in 52 cities). Do they approve of the government of K. Bielecki, the outline of his program: definitely yes, 12 percent; rather yes, 22 percent; half and half, 18 percent; rather not, 8 percent; definitely not, 8 percent; no opinion, 32 percent. Some nominees for ministerial posts were questionable, 17 percent: 143 respondents mentioned L. Balcerowicz; 39, M. Boni; 20, M. Rostworowski; 20, A. Tanski.

The police officials met with journalists: in 1990 crime rose by 80 percent since 1989; crimes against property by 100 percent (data for 11 months). "I assume that in 1991 we will halt this increase," said L. Lamparski, the main commandant of the police. So-called 100-percent security zones will be formed which patrols will cover 24 hours a day (in Warsaw, the King's Way from the Old Town to Wilanów, Marszałkowska, Jerusalem Blvd., the Main Train Station; in Łódź, Piastowska St.; in Kraków, the Square). There will also be women police officers: "The experience of many Western countries shows that intervention by women can be more effective than men." The police will be equipped with Western vehicles (there is talk of Peugeots, Volkswagens, and Iveco trucks). Commissioner Jan Czop from Kraków (age 31, a lawyer) has replaced Jan Świeczynski as press spokesman for the Main Commandant of the Police.

Price increases. Food prices have increased: skim milk by 600-950 zlotys per liter; farmer's cheese, low-fat by 700 zlotys, regular by 1,500 zlotys (depending on the market). Price increases for bread have been announced (private Lublin bakers, by 530 zlotys). New telecommunication rates for foreign service have gone into effect: the rate for a regular letter to all countries increased to 1,500-2,000 zlotys; a minute's telephone call to the United States and Canada now costs 23,100 zlotys (previously, 16,500 zlotys). The price of domestic alcohol products increased an average of 40 percent.

The average wage increased in December 1990 by 1.6 percent in comparison with November and was 1,454,386 zloty in the five sectors of the national economy, calculated without profit sharing.

The Center Accord called for holding the parliamentary elections "as soon as possible", i.e., in the spring. [passage omitted]

Lech Walesa on decrees: "The form of decrees must be used, but they will not be presidential decrees. My idea goes further. I think that in time we should name authorities, perhaps parliamentary ones, a body of up to 10 persons, who as difficulties occur or a need for a solution arises would prepare the decrees. They would then be considered first at the next session of the Sejm." [passage omitted]

Poland's debt at the end of 1990 to all creditors was \$46.1 billion. As J. Sawicki, deputy minister of finance, said in the Sejm, Poland is capable of paying barely 12-20 percent of the interest. There is a danger that Poland's debt will grow to more than \$100 billion in 2000.

According to a survey by the Center For Research on Public Opinion over 1990 the majority of public institutions lost trust: the most the government, from 82 percent in January to 52 percent; then Solidarity, from 75 percent to 52 percent; the Sejm from 78 percent to 57 percent; the Senate from 75 percent to 55 percent. The church lost 10 percent of its trust, and the military retained the same level. Only the police gained in trust, by 10 percent.

Father Jan Szarek (age 54) the senior of the Cieszyn Diocese has been elected Bishop of the Lutheran Church (Augsburg Confession) in Poland. His predecessor Father Janusz Narzynski resigned due to bad health.

The chancellery of the new president asked parliament to make a change increasing the budget by 16.5 billion zlotys (to a total of 229.6 billion). Six billion are needed for addition personnel costs, and 10 billion for foreign travel.

Who's Who. The new head of radio and television is Marian Terlecki (age 36) screen writer and film director; in 1981 he was editor in chief of Solidarity Television, imprisoned during martial law, from January 1990 head of Gdansk television. He is the coauthor of a book about

L. Walesa. The new head of Polish Radio is Marek Owsinski (age 46) for the last year director of the fourth program of Polish Radio; he was chosen by the employees, interned in during martial law. The president named Slawomir Siwek (age 40), longtime journalist for the Catholic press, secretary of state in the presidential chancellery responsible for contacts with the parliament, government, social and political organizations, and with the church. The president named Jacek Maziarski (age 54), journalist for TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC, undersecretary in the same chancellery for preparations of forecasts and analyses for the president. Andrzej Zarebski (age 33), head of the political section of GAZETA GDANSKA, cofounder of the Gdansk Congress of Liberals, interned after 13 December 1981, has been named press spokesman for the radio. Jacek Snopkiewicz, the head of the television news program WIA-DOMOSCI, and his assistants Zbigniew Domaranczyk and Kazimierz Korawski submitted their resignations. Prof. Jacek Wozniakowski has been removed from the position of president of Krakow by the city council.

EXPRESS WIECZORNY has been sold by the Liquidation Commission for the Workers' Publishing Cooperative for 16 billion zloty to the Solidarity Press Foundation, i.e. the Center Accord. The editorial staff supported the sale of the paper to the United Entertainment Enterprise, which offered the same sum. Lech Walesa, then president-elect, supported the sale to the Solidarity Foundation. SZTUKA, the oldest artistic publication in Poland, has renewed its publication as a monthly devoted to contemporary art. The first issue will appear in February 1991. An issue costs 12,000 zloty. Subscriptions, annual (144,000 zlotys) and six-month (72,000 zlotys), can be sent to the editors of SZTUKA Warsaw, Wilcza St. 46; tel. 28-68-65; bank account PBK VIII/Warszawa, 370028-700232-132. [passage omitted]

Opinions

[passage omitted]

Stanislaw Kocjan, first deputy chairman of the National Coordinating Commission of Solidarity '80:

(Interviewed by Ryszard Zajac, DZIENNIK ZACHODNI 2-3 January 1991)

[Question] Is it probable that Solidarity '80 following the other unions, just in the context of the upcoming parliamentary elections, will create a political arm?

[Answer] To be sure, we are thinking about it. The times of pickets, occupations, hunger strikes, local strikes are passing. We will be more effective if we develop our own parliamentary representation, if there is a way also to express our positions, reasons, and demands in the parliamentary forum. We must, however, take care not to become similar to Walesa's union—a structure with political ability, but dead as a union. [passage omitted]

Participation in Pentagonal Group Increases

91EP0247B Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish
23 Jan 91 p 4

[Article by Anna Boros from Budapest: "Poland in the Pentagonal Group"]

[Text] During a press conference in Budapest, Minister Skubiszewski stated that we have a good chance of being full members of the Pentagonal Group by the middle of the year. On Hungarian TV the Hungarian Ambassador to Poland was very critical of the way the mass media has been presenting the situation in Poland.

There was a press conference in Budapest following the Monday meeting of the Hungarian, Czechoslovak, and Polish foreign affairs ministers. The establishment of a new strategy towards the Warsaw Pact (which we wrote about in yesterday's paper) was described. Our correspondent asked whether Poland would be part of the Pentagonal Group, which now consists of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Austria, and Italy.

Minister Skubiszewski replied that there are real prospects for us to be accepted into this group during the latter half of this year. A group summit, to take place in Dubrovnik, will determine this. Even now Poland is working with this group in various areas, such as environmental protection and certain transportation matters. Skubiszewski said: "We have been invited as an observer to the group's next meeting at the ministerial level to be held during the first half of this year. Along with Sweden, Poland will set up Baltic cooperation, through which we would like to be represented in the Pentagonal Group."

The day before the press conference, Akos Engelmayr, the Hungarian Ambassador to Poland, appeared on "Napzarta," a popular television news magazine, devoted that day to Polish-Czechoslovak-Hungarian cooperation. Ambassador Engelmayr said that since 1939 there have never been more favorable conditions for cooperation between Poland and Hungary than there are now, but, he continued, "press and television in both countries help kindle disputes by spreading false information, instead of helping to develop cooperation. Hungarian society, for example, has no idea about what is actually going on in Poland. It has no idea about the economic miracle that has occurred there during the past year. It knows nothing of how eagerly Poles are awaiting Hungarian initiatives for economic cooperation."

Center Accord, Presidential Chancellery Discussed

91EP0251A Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish
26-27 Jan 91 p 3

[Interview with Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski, chief, Presidential Chancellery, by Janina Paradowska; place and date not given: "It's Only an Opportunity"]

[Text] [Paradowska] Almost a year has passed since you began to champion Lech Walesa's presidency and at the

same time initiated a schism within Solidarity. Has this operation benefited Poland?

[Kaczynski] Precisely now it is patently evident that it has benefited, and very much at that. Of course, the change took place too late and, in that sense, the operation, intended to promote acceleration, has not been completely successful. It should have taken place earlier. The simply unprecedented passivity of the previous administration, its do-nothing attitude which essentially consisted of ignoring important issues, has been to Poland an obvious misfortune.

[Paradowska] What issues?

[Kaczynski] The worsening of the international situation which we are witnessing nowadays, observing what is happening in the Soviet Union, could have been anticipated. It was not, so that now Poland is entering upon a dangerous period while the process of building its democratic system is not yet completed, while its new international status is still in a flux, and while issues such as the stationing of Soviet troops in Poland have not yet been resolved. At present it is becoming more difficult to resolve these problems.

[Paradowska] It is easy to mention all this now. Several months ago this particular course of events had not been that obvious.

[Kaczynski] But please, in the last two years the situation in and around Poland has been changing very rapidly. It can even be said that in 1989 it changed with every season of the year, and in 1990 there were many changes. One should have kept track of the events and tried to be a step ahead of them. The big mistake of the previous administration was that it had failed to perceive these changes in time, while in its domestic policy it adhered obstinately to the roundtable accord, which had long since become a relic of another era.

[Paradowska] Your statements do not jibe somehow. You said that the change in the presidency benefited Poland, but at the same time you stated that the "acceleration" [advocated by Walesa] has not been successful.

[Kaczynski] We are entering upon a very dangerous period for Poland in the absence of the former-regime president. So this important issue has been resolved. But the acceleration has not been accomplished, because the new government is incapable of implementing it in the manner desired by my party. We had wanted more radical changes in the mode of pursuing the economic policy—of course without negating the evident successes of the previous policy, such as the smothering of inflation and the restoration of a normal currency.

[Paradowska] You are using the comparative "more radical" in the sense of personnel changes, are you not? The struggle against the nomenklatura is a continuing problem for the Center Accord party, is not it? Sometimes I get the impression that it is a kind of obsession with it.

[Kaczynski] Yes, we also desire personnel changes, but that is not all. The point also is to involve the public, to accelerate privatization. As for the [continued existence of the] nomenklatura, that is not an obsession with us; it is a fact which grates upon broad segments of the society. At present, I believe, it is not possible to effectively eliminate the nomenklatura in the economy. It is by now very strong; it is a regulator of the economy, and it tremendously obstructs adjusting the economy to genuinely free-market rules. This is producing far-reaching consequences. The resulting situation is not accepted by the active segment of the society, which therefore finds it difficult to identify itself with reform measures. And lastly, this can become a point of departure for forfeiting Poland's independence.

[Paradowska] You mean, for making Poland dependent on the Soviet Union, do you not? I would think that Poland's dependence lies in a totally different direction.

[Kaczynski] I am not precluding other possibilities. But they are not as dangerous as the existence in Poland of the nomenklatura, which, when feeling menaced by the antagonism of the society, could appeal for help to an outside source. Should a lasting change occur in the Soviet Union in the direction which we have been observing as regards recent measures in Lithuania and other republics, such an appeal could fall on fertile soil. This is extremely dangerous to Poland. That is why I spoke of the passivity of the previous administration, which has protected the nomenklatura, thereby exposing Poland to social and political risks. Walesa's presidency offers a chance for changing all this. We shall not continue the previous policy and I hope that, following the parliamentary elections, we shall be able to pursue the new policy more energetically.

[Paradowska] You said awhile ago that the present administration has not done much about that matter.

[Kaczynski] Still, we now have the new president, who is the commander in chief of the armed forces, and who has entrusted military and security issues to Minister of State Jacek Merk. So something is beginning to be done about this extremely sensitive issue. But what about the administration? From the outset I have been saying that it is not radically minded.

[Paradowska] Your party is being accused of having refused to accept responsibility for the country following the presidential elections. Why is it that you did not try to form a radically minded government?

[Kaczynski] It is untrue that Center Accord was not ready to accept the responsibility. Jan Olszewski's mission represented an attempt to do so, to form a Center Accord government. That would have been the best solution, in my opinion. Unfortunately, it came to nothing, because we could not agree to certain program planks and personnel appointments. A major reason for the failure of Olszewski's mission was Balcerowicz and his retention in the same post, although I wish to

emphasize that the point was not to have him removed or his influence reduced. We do appreciate his contributions and merits.

[Paradowska] So it was the Western influence.

[Kaczynski] Among other things, it too.

[Paradowska] But why did the president and you reject the proposal for a coalition agreement with Mazowiecki and his grouping?

[Kaczynski] Could we have said to our voters that we are making fun of their opinion? After all, a substantial proportion of those who had voted for Walesa were very negatively disposed toward the Mazowiecki government. Another problem was considerations of merit. For a long time now we have had a very poor opinion of the policy of the previous administration. Speaking plainly, we viewed it as an irresponsible policy pursued by a group of individuals whose life experiences were such that they could not understand the changing situation. They believed that the changes would take years and would proceed slowly in an evolutionary manner. Such was the mentality of that entire generation with its experience of October 1956 [bloody suppression of workers' bread riots in Poznan by the communist regime] and flirting with communism—with the exception of Jan Olszewski, Zdzislaw Najder, and perhaps several other less known activists who had, though, retired from the fray instead of showing active commitment and trying to persuade others to verify that policy. And that group has never subjected its policy to the test of life itself.

[Paradowska] Not so long ago someone said that the camp of your political adversaries keeps seeing the same dangers and hence hews to a minimum program, whereas your camp perceives only possibilities for success, even when such possibilities do not exist.

[Kaczynski] An Olszewski government would have been the best solution and could have scored successes. But it is not true that I perceive no dangers. I perceive them clearly.

[Paradowska] But, to stay on the track of that opinion, could I ask you something else? Some two weeks ago I talked with your political adversary Jan Rokita, and we had concluded that Solidarity may lose power fairly readily and within a foreseeable period of time.

[Kaczynski] What does it mean, Solidarity?

[Paradowska] Any one of the post-Solidarity groupings.

[Kaczynski] That is a highly simplified and journalistic perception of the reality; there exist premises such as a shrinking popularity and a growing group of malcontents, and hence the effect has to be such and no other. But politics is something quite different from journalistic conclusions. Obviously, politics begins with these premises, but the effect depends not on whether a conclusion is logical but on the policy pursued and its effectiveness. Mazowiecki lost because he had pursued a

poor policy geared to meeting his, I would say, personal traits and needs. Now that Walesa is the head of state, a chance for the new policy to be more effective has arisen, although the situation is incredibly difficult, more difficult than that which Mazowiecki had to face. Above all, much depends on whether the hopes placed in Walesa's presidency will be fulfilled, whether the young will perceive the existence of career opportunities. You see, despite my skeptical stance toward the present administration, I believe that it has a chance. It consists of young people who are not encumbered by the experiences and mentality of that other camp, people with a completely different educational background and broad contacts with the West. What is characteristic is that the West was less surprised than the Poles when Bielecki became the prime minister, because he is known there. Walesa's calculations that this government can accomplish something—that being precisely the experience of Spain—and score success, may thus prove true. And if successes, even if small ones, are scored, then the public will react differently. Of course, to some extent, the Solidarity era is coming to an end. In the future there will occur such changes as to render it difficult to tell clearly which groupings are of Solidarity origin and which are not.

[Paradowska] We shall know them by their leaders, who will remain the same, whatever the grouping. Not without some sarcasm, let me add that we shall also know them by the vacuity of their program planks.

[Kaczynski] We are barely past our first free presidential elections. That is a very short period of time since communism was toppled, and it is difficult to expect that distinct political groupings should exist by now. It is also difficult to expect any major change of the guard. Even if we assume that, at a time like the present, politicians get worn out more rapidly, some 12 to 15 months is still too short a period for them to depart from the scene.

[Paradowska] Do not you feel disturbed by the paucity of the Polish political scene?

[Kaczynski] It is indeed disturbing, but what matters more is how to answer the question of why that scene is not richer, broader.

[Paradowska] Do you ever ponder this question?

[Kaczynski] I ask myself this question quite often, and the answer is not simple. Most often, of course, this can be attributed to the circumstances under which political groupings had originated: the conspiratorial underground, and hence also the existence of only a limited number of persons who had decided to engage in these activities. But there also exist other, deeper reasons, such as the huge wave of emigration of individuals who used to be extremely active, or the possibility of accomplishing one's aspirations in terms of engaging in private enterprise. Please consider the Solidarity of the early 1980's, when there had been quite a few applicants for every post, with the record being 41 applicants. That had been a period of political supereffectiveness, but also a

period when other opportunities [private enterprise] had been blocked. Now these opportunities exist and people have a choice.

[Paradowska] But what will happen to Center Accord, now that you are holding a position in the government?

[Kaczynski] I remain an active member of Center Accord and believe that soon now it will transform itself into a regular political party.

[Paradowska] So an umbrella conglomerate of different groupings will become a single party?

[Kaczynski] This is desired by the Center Accord membership, and it is possible to create such a modern Christian democratic party resembling the German CDU [Christian Democratic Union], which had also been formed owing to a fusion of the Christian democratic and liberal movements. I believe that we shall make it work. We already are affiliated with the Christian Democratic International. Of course, before the [parliamentary] elections we shall certainly conclude some alliances, but not with the Democratic Union [Mazowiecki's group], because such an alliance would be ineffective and inexpedient. Instead, we are disposed toward forming a centrist coalition. The possibilities vary.

[Paradowska] In your opinion, when should the elections be held? There seems to be no consensus on this question.

[Kaczynski] As early as possible, that is, even before the visit by Pope John Paul II. I know that this will be difficult, but I consider it feasible and necessary. Poland's external situation is changing, and so completing the construction of a democratic system is becoming extremely urgent. I do not expect the situation to improve before the fall, which means that the prestige of the present administration is sure to become somewhat tarnished. Everything seems to indicate that the elections should be expedited, because their winner is uncertain if they are scheduled too far off.

[Paradowska] What are your political plans in the immediate future?

[Kaczynski] Expediting the elections, strengthening the Center Accord, and, after the elections, eventually concluding alliances which would make it possible to form a government with a stable parliamentary substructure.

[Paradowska] What dangers to these plans do you perceive?

[Kaczynski] In addition to the external dangers, which are at present quite substantial, there is also the danger of a collapse of the reform process. This may happen either owing to elementary public resistance or precisely as a result of the coming parliamentary elections. If major winners in the elections include forces inspired by domestic and external elements—and I claim that these do exist—which intend to nullify the changes so far, or

forces of an inherently undemocratic nature, then enormous complications may set in.

[Paradowska] Do you expect such a course of events?

[Kaczynski] It is possible. It would suffice for these forces to win a sizable number of parliamentary seats—and I mean not only some post-PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] groupings but also rightist groupings deriving from completely different roots—in order to block the reform process.

[Paradowska] We are thus in a seemingly no-win situation, are we not?

[Kaczynski] This is indeed a difficult situation, and that is why a strong presidency is so greatly needed, as it precisely affords at present an opportunity for averting worst case scenarios, but only an opportunity.

Silesia: Dual Citizenship Issue Intensifies

91EP0265A Bonn RHEINISCHER MERKUR/CHRIST UND WELT in German 18 Jan 91 p 8

[Article by Sabine Suetterlin, Opole: "Partners, but Without Extras"]

[Text] "We," the three little ones declaim. Then they falter and the huge pink bow in the pigtails of the one girl quakes a little. "Welcome" whispers the elderly woman, "welcome" is repeated loud and by three voices. Again hesitation. The grandmother continues to prompt word for word until the little ones have completed the sentence: "We welcome the German ambassador from Warsaw in Gogolin."

The brave little ones and their grandmother are members of the German minority in the Upper Silesian town of Gogolin. But the words which the grandchildren were supposed to recite to welcome the ambassador consist of sounds that are strange to them. The youngest generation knows only Polish while the middle generation speaks broken German and the older generation speaks an archaic German.

The German ambassador traveled to Upper Silesia because that is to change now. Since early 1989 everyone who still knows German may again speak German here in public, too. That was prohibited for 40 years.

The German Government wants to help the minority nurture its culture once again, but in a manner so that the understandably distrustful Poles do not have to suspect that Silesia is to be taken "home to the Reich" again.

The German Friendship Circles which have been established in many villages and towns of the area since January 1990 are supposed to receive books and office supplies from Bonn. And the universities are training teachers so that the schools will be able to provide German language instruction.

The ambassador is on a three-day visit to the voivodship of Opole (in German, Oppeln), one of Poland's 49 administrative districts. Opole is situated at the Czech-Polish border, is 8,500 square kilometers in area, and geographically overlaps to a great extent the former Prussian half-province of Upper Silesia. It is the only area in Poland where, after the expulsions in 1945, a considerable number of ethnic Germans have remained, probably because they were needed as workers in the nearby industrial region of Katowice (Kattowitz).

Nobody knows exactly how many there are now, after three big waves of emigration in the direction of the FRG. Estimates range from 100,000 to 350,000. The entire region has over 1 million inhabitants, Polish and German Silesians, but also many Poles who were forced to resettle from Poland's eastern regions which were annexed by the Soviet Union.

The Voivode Encounters a Frigid Reception

"The German Government," Ambassador Guenther Knackstedt now tells the approximately two dozen women and men assembled in the Gogolin town hall, "that the Poles are also interested in your remaining here and feeling comfortable," and he talks about all the things the embassy has arranged.

Then he speaks about the German-Polish border treaty. This probably means a "turning point for many here who perhaps had hoped"—that Silesia would become the 17th federal land. But the coming friendship treaty between the two states will provide them with sufficient latitude to live their identity. "The German minority in the long run has a future only if it works and lives peacefully together with its environment."

But the ambassador's placatory words find reserved friendly applause. But then the atmosphere in the hall becomes noticeably frigid. The voivode speaks, in Polish. Ryszard Zembaczynski, a gaunt man in his midforties, is a reserved, diplomatic person. He would like, he said, for Germans and Poles to be able to live together as equal partners. The German minority should have the right to put up memorials "where Germans have lived and suffered." It is to have access to the media and nominate candidates for the Sejm, the parliament in Warsaw, and the Senate. But, the voivode makes it clear, as loyal Polish citizens: "There must be no dual citizenship."

Chilly silence in the hall. Only after a little while does one man ask to speak; his message is in German and clear: "I can agree with everything except for the matter of dual citizenship." A second man, who came from Katowice, takes the same line, as does a woman from Czestochowa (Tschenstochau): "We have never lost German citizenship! It is only important that we regain it."

Henryk (Heinrich) Kroll, veterinarian from Krapkowice (Krapitz), one of the spokesmen, really talked himself into a rage—in Polish, thus clearly addressed to the

voivode: What is being discussed is "homeland" and the fact that the Silesians once more were not asked about the state to which they wanted to belong.

Now even the ambassador quite undiplomatically blew his top: "I had actually expected this would be more harmonious," he sighs and comes to the point: The border treaty has been democratically supported in both parliaments and is final, Guenther Knackstedt says, a plebiscite on Silesia's affiliation or an "internationalization" of the territory is not acceptable. "Peace is endangered by playing with such ideas and illusions."

The controversy in the Gogolin town hall seems to confirm all the prejudices that are aroused by the phrase "Germans in Silesia": thoughts associated with the expellee organizations in the FRG and their functionaries, the two aged Silesians Herbert Czaja and Herbert Hupka, ultrareactionaries who would like it best if Germany's borders were those of the Reich in 1937, who regard the German-Polish border treaty signed in Warsaw on 14 November 1990 as treason by the federal government, and for whom Silesia continues to be "German territory under Polish administration."

The picture is deceiving. Not all members of the German minority act as militantly as the hard core here in the Gogolin town hall.

"I am a Silesian," smilingly says Gerard Bartodziej in fluent German. The 49-year-old electrical engineer and assistant professor at Gliwice (Gleiwitz) Technical University since May has been council chairman of Strzelce Opolskie (Gross-Strehlitz), a town of 22,000 inhabitants 20 kilometers east of Gogolin. Since he had never belonged to any party, he was urged by the citizens forum to become a candidate to prevent the old Communist Party leadership from distributing all positions among themselves.

The fact that he was an ethnic German did not matter. Even eight more Germans were elected to the 31-member town council. Germans, some of them organized in cultural clubs, moved into political offices also in other Upper Silesian localities in these local elections. They hold the council majority in 18 of 63 municipalities of the voivodship.

"I am a Silesian, but my roots are German and I have lived here as a good Polish citizen." Gerard Bartodziej's family has been living in the area "for many generations," he relates, and all of them have always spoken both languages. Proudly he shows a scientific standard work which he wrote—in Polish. Bartodziej sees no basic problem in Poles and Germans living together. "The situation is complex," he says, "but it is not dangerous."

But the idea that the situation may be dangerous could arise among those who hear the militant sounds in the Gogolin town hall and who know that Johann Kroll, Heinrich Kroll's father and the initiator of the German Friendship Circle, started a questionable collection of signatures in the spring. Whoever considered himself to

be a German was supposed to have his name listed. Within six weeks, 350,000 had signed. Playing with fire and moreover an action that smacks of "ethnic lists" and "plebiscite for Silesia's affiliation."

The driving force behind that is the Federation of Expellees (BdV) of Bonn. "They are our relatives," says Johann Kroll almost defiantly. The pensioner from Gogolin maintains good contacts with the BdV but he is not a member. The position advocated by the federation in Germany hardly concerns him: "I don't know what they are fighting for there. The only thing I know is that they support us." Kroll says he is now getting 30 Xerox machines and the equipment for 300 offices. "Thus far the embassy has sent us only a few copiers and video antennas."

Which, of course, is not true. But the teaching aids and the literature, the financial assistance for rental of meeting houses and the salaries of the teachers who are still in training at the expense of the federal government, to these people, may only look insignificant in comparison with the way the BdV shows off (and it should be noted that the BdV this year receives 20.4 million German marks [DM] from the Kohl government for the "preservation of the cultural heritage").

The expellees in Germany, that is the impression the German minority must get, for all the years have been the only ones who were at all interested in their fate. The communist Polish state denied its existence (as it did with other minorities, e.g., the Ukrainians, or with regional groups such as the Kashubians). The state did not permit the members of the German minority to speak German, to read German, newspapers or to nurture German culture.

And official Germany appeared to have forgotten the Silesians. In the meantime the BdV nourished the hope that someday they would be part of Germany again.

Reunification had hardly emerged and Kohl and Mazowiecki had hardly gotten the arduous German-Polish rapprochement under way when Hartmut Koschyk, second-generation expellee, speaking Franconian dialect and BdV secretary general and just entering the Bundestag for the CSU [Christian Social Union], drafted a plan: He wanted to make Silesia the topic of the 2 + 4 negotiations on German unity by plebiscite. When nothing came of that, he already had the next idea ready: "Europeanization of Silesia," in other words, its removal from Polish sovereignty to become an autonomous region under European sovereignty.

Practically the only source of information available to the German minority is the SCHLESISCHE NACHRICHTEN. It is published in Koenigswinter near Bonn and is now sold unhindered in all of Silesia at newsstands and even in front of the basilica on St. Annaberg, where the Franciscan Fathers have been conducting masses in German again for the past year and a half. Even during

the week when the German-Polish treaty was signed, the newspaper opposed the "border diktat" at the Oder-Neisse line.

Thus it is not surprising that many feel disappointed by the political reality and think Germany has finally "betrayed them and sold them down the river" with the border treaty. Above all those who remained behind even when the younger ones emigrated in droves because as ethnic Germans they receive a German passport in the FRG and have better opportunities to find work than in the run-down Polish economy.

In the meantime the minority activists have established a "central council" to which each district organization sends a representative. The presidium went to Bonn and submitted a list of 16 demands to the government.

A German Passport Is the Biggest Wish

In addition to the things that are underway, such as German language instruction, their own media, establishing clubs, the minority also demanded "unhindered cooperation with the expellee organizations" and the "right to form parties of their own." But above all the last of the 16 points is controversial: It demands "continuation of German citizenship and the exercise of the FRG's duty to provide protection and social welfare services."

Many have already applied for German passports, although the Polish Government does not recognize dual citizenship. What if it continues its refusal? "Then all of us are going to renounce our Polish passports," Johann Kroll replied, "they can't throw us out."

Small wonder that, in the face of such attitudes, some Poles continue to react with hostility. The region is deeply mired in ecological and economic distress. It is bleeding to death because the younger people and the intelligentsia emigrate. The factories in the surrounding area do not know whether they are going to survive. Even agriculture, two-thirds of which is still operated by private small farmers, has been getting worse for some years. Prices have collapsed and the distribution system does not function.

The Germans who have remained behind have advantages anyhow: Most of them have relatives in Germany. And now they even want the sought-after German passport to be able to earn money with it in the rich neighboring country.

"No privileges" is then the basic tenor in the circle which the German ambassador meets in Opole following his Gogolin visit. It is a group of the local intelligentsia, scientists of the Silesian Institute, representatives of political groups, the church, and the media; most of them are Poles or Polish Silesians. The Germans, most of them agree, are welcome to develop and nurture their cultural identity, but they are not to receive any privileges.

Gerard Bartodziej, the council chairman of Strzelce Opolskie, expresses it as follows: "The problems that we in Silesia have to solve are everyone's problems." Bartodziej has now established a citizens foundation which has already collected 100 million zlotys (DM14,000). But he has also asked the German Bundestag for a credit and has also sought support from the Silesian Welfare and Cultural Association in the BdV: "We can survive only with help from the outside."

YUGOSLAVIA

Josip Manolic on Solution of Knin Crisis

91BA0222A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
15 Jan 91 pp 18-19

[Interview with Josip Manolic, president of the Croatian Government, by Marinko Culic; place and date not given: "Everything According to Law"—first paragraph is DANAS introduction]

[Text] The president of the Croatian Government on the history of talks with representatives of Serbian districts, on the political and police solution of the Knin crisis, about its role in the Belgrade negotiations, about the accusations of illegal arming by the Croatian police, the Serbian financial bomb and the resignation of Sima Rajic

Not long after it became clear that the latest, third round of talks with representatives of the Serbian districts had failed, we are talking about it with the president of the Croatian Government, Josip Manolic, who was the initiator of the originally scheduled dialogue in the assembly. The president is dividing the reasons for the decision to talk into those that were directly imposed from above and those that are of a more lasting nature.

[Manolic] The direct motivation for talks is more or less known; they're tied to the report on the establishment of the so-called Serbian region of Krajina and separately to the news about the establishment of an independent service for internal affairs. We wanted to warn representatives of these districts that the establishment of such a service is against the law, not from the standpoint of the regulations passed by the new government in Croatia, but from the standpoint of regulations that we inherited from the former government. In addition, signals arrived from these districts about numerous unresolved questions on management, the financing of social services, etc., in which we are interested as a republic government that should function on all its territory. This is also a link with the long-term reasons because of which we consider these kinds of talks necessary and useful. If you recall, we initiated and conducted these talks with Mr. Raskovic back in the preelection campaign, and this was continued immediately upon the assumption of power, when we sought a mutual solution with the Serbian representatives to a series of questions, including who would represent the Serbs in the highest government organs.

[Culic] Some have already remarked that the latest occurrences with the Serbian Military District of Krajina are only the taking of positions on the eve of the Belgrade negotiations. Is your call for talks an attempt to parry this and thus strengthen your own position in these negotiations?

[Manolic] We did not begin from that. We don't see a need especially to confirm some kind of starting position for negotiations either in these or in any other talks, because our starting position is known; it stems from the principle of the sovereignty of Croatia, which we built into the Constitution, so there's no need for it to be additionally confirmed.

[Culic] As to the acts that can be understood as escalation of the "bridge of revolution," the Croatian leadership acted with decisiveness to bring them to an end, although it was viewed differently based on whether Croatia has the necessary government apparatus for this or not. Does the recent statement by Josip Boljkovac that one would react "with all necessary legal resources" mean that this dilemma is now disappearing?

[Manolic] Up to now we have had sufficient police forces to reduce the appearance and activities of paramilitary formations that have formed in the Knin area and elsewhere in the republic. However, we began with the assessment that the unselective and unplanned use of these forces would create a real danger of bloodshed. Thus we attempted to reach the same goal by a political route, by dialogue, and by negotiations at different levels, from the president of the Serbian Democratic Party to the president of the district. And although this was an exceptionally difficult and thorny path, I think it can be shown how specific results were achieved. Not only because the outbreak of open clashes was prevented, which was our first intention, but also because we nevertheless succeeded in having the question begin to be posed within the Serbian populace as to where the "bridge building" of relations with the Croatian people was leading. Although this differentiation is not going at the same speed everywhere, and sometimes it seems that things are beginning to develop in the opposite direction, I think that it is nevertheless an irreversibly open process which, in my opinion, will lead in the end to a diplomatic outcome of the situation in districts where Serbs constitute the majority. This process has already gone far enough that the circle of the most militant groups and the people who are ready to fanatically assault the new Croatian Government can now be separated quite clearly. In such a situation the job of repressive organs is facilitated, since they have groups before them about whose intentions there is no doubt, and against which only repressive measures can be applied.

[Culic] In the latest statements by Croatian leaders, resolution of the crisis in Croatia is tied to the negotiations in Belgrade. Isn't the statement by the minister of internal affairs, which is reporting energetic action, at odds with this? Besides, similar promises were already made by this Ministry several times, but they were not

kept, so a question of responsibility arises, if not for what's been done, then for such statements.

[Manolic] I don't think one can talk about differences in the statements by Minister Boljkovac and the leaders you mention. First of all one should look at the moment when each statement was made, because things change so quickly that what you state today, you must already correct and add to tomorrow. In addition, Minister Boljkovac reacted to a clearly specific event, and in his review of it did not intend to give an overall interpretation of official Croatian policy. Thus one cannot even speak about his coming into disagreement with the basic aims of this policy. As to possible responsibility, naturally one cannot flee from it, but someone's responsibility for the Knin crisis cannot be sought before one separates what caused it. The Knin crisis has roots not only in Croatia, it also has them in the situation in the whole country, so one can speak about resolving it only after its roots are cut off. With this I don't want to say that the Knin crisis doesn't represent a problem in and of itself, but its resolution must be synchronized with the resolution of all the other causes of the Yugoslav crisis.

[Culic] If the negotiations in Belgrade do not produce quick results, what will be undertaken within the framework of Croatian capabilities, to quiet down the Knin trouble spot?

[Manolic] One really shouldn't expect spectacular news from Belgrade because the negotiations will certainly be long and difficult. But this is the beginning of the first serious talks about the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis and we regard them highly because of this. I have already said that we expect the results of the Belgrade negotiations to be reflected beneficially on the situation in Croatia, but it is precisely because of the fact that one cannot expect their prompt completion that we must deal with the situation in Croatia and rely on what can be done with our own forces. The primary task, and this needs no special explanation, is to set up the correct system established under the new Constitution.

[Culic] Along with that, will some steps, which the Croatian government has taken up to now, be investigated—for example, closing the financial faucets to "disobedient" districts, which also punishes those who are not guilty of the "bridge building" of Croatia and thus probably makes the search for a resolution still more difficult?

[Manolic] I said something about that in my answer to the first question. I repeat that we also initiated talks with representatives of the districts with a majority Serbian population with the wish to assist these districts in dealing with burning management problems, problems with sustaining the social standard, and the like. It can't be in anyone's interest, not even ours in the government, if these problems remain open anywhere in the republic, and actions where a Serbian majority predominates are certainly no exception to this.

[Culic] Does this mean that the closing of the faucets will nevertheless be handled more cautiously?

[Manolic] Cautious or less cautious closing is not the issue. The issue is the total resolution of the problems that are appearing in those parts of the republic. Of course we are desirous of help, but it is probably clear at the same time that we can't be invited to turn the faucet more carefully where communications have been interrupted, and where nothing—hospitals, schools, nurseries, and the rest—functions as it should because of this. And especially where the government is not functioning normally from the top on down, which has now occurred to an acute degree.

[Culic] But objections are also coming in from districts that have responded of late to the talks in the Assembly.

[Manolic] Perhaps, but we are interested in any case that their problems, within the framework of available resources, be eliminated as soon as possible. We simply must respect some rules of the game within the framework of the right system that we build, and we are particularly concerned about differentiating between districts that are prepared to accept these rules and those that stubbornly step on them and destroy them. Thus, we will continue with these talks, and I am convinced that over the long term they will also be useful to the districts and the republic as a whole.

[Culic] Don't you nevertheless have the impression that the differentiation about which you speak is also a form of restricting the talks, although a comparison probably can't be made with the conditions existing in Knin?

[Manolic] For our part, there is no restriction on the talks. Can it be said that we are setting some kind of conditions if we are seeking to have the legal and constitutional system that we legitimately elected be respected? All other countries in the world do this, and it is known what legal instruments are used to assure the functioning of the legal system. Our intention is to make it possible, through these talks and by political means, for the time in which the system will begin to function normally to be shortened as much as possible.

[Culic] What kind of place is being given to Yugoslavia in the resolution of the Knin crisis? What does the recently quoted position mean that a consensus will be sought on this question at the national level?

[Manolic] There will be no talk about any kind of consensus if it is meant by this that it is a problem that someone would resolve outside or even next to Croatia. It is a problem of this republic, which is in a position to resolve it itself, although this, of course, does not exclude the possibility that political factors in other parts of Yugoslavia will thereby be explained. Only in this context, and not in the context of some kind of arbitration that would be forced on Croatia, do I see a justification for some consensus on the Knin question to be spoken about.

[Culic] Advisers to President Tudjman mentioned a consensus in a recent conversation with reporters.

[Manolic] All right, I don't have anything against consensus either, but only under the condition that I have now mentioned. Croatia is seeking that federal organs judge the unlawful actions and tyranny of the illegal groups in Knin and around it, and that political talks for resolving the problem in Croatia be recommended.

[Culic] Something else has come from the federal organs, however—an order that irregular armed forces throughout the republics be disarmed. Croatia has already "recognized" itself in that order and replied that it does not consider its militia irregular. How do you comment on the order of the Presidency of the SFRY?

[Manolic] The same way you did in broadcasting the first reactions from Croatia. There are no irregular military or paramilitary units in Croatia. The only irregular formations are those that are active in the Knin area, and periodically in some districts of Lika as well. Moreover, in that very order of the Presidency of the SFRY, it is explicitly stated that it does not refer to existing units of organs of law and order, therefore the militia.

[Culic] How did Croatia nevertheless "recognize" itself then?

[Manolic] That doesn't stem from the order itself, since it is written in rather unspecific language. An explanation of the order that was not put in public view is clearer, and from this it is clear that Croatia and Slovenia were actually being referred to. Specifically, it says in it that the paramilitary formations that should be disarmed were equipped through the illegal import of weapons, and it is known to whom such accusations are directed.

[Culic] Is it accidental, in your opinion, that this order appeared right on the eve of the Belgrade negotiations?

[Manolic] It is quite certain that the order appeared after international circumstances, and immediately thereafter, circumstances in the country were weighed very carefully. If you connect the appearance of this order with the affair that resulted from Serbia's invasion of the payments system of the country, it is completely clear that with this order they wished to divert attention from that criminal financial robbery. One must know that important interests are in question and that the acts of the federal presidency have been adapted to this. Serbia, with its invasion of the payments system, destroyed the monetary system of Yugoslavia, and that's the same as if you placed a bomb of the greatest destructive power under the management of the whole country. When this is taken into account, it is understandable that the Serbian political leadership came to the perception that the negative effects of this can be covered up only through some political decision of approximately equal power. In this way things were smoothed over and the idea arose about issuing the above-mentioned order. That's a special type of extortion which was directed

from Serbia to the two northwestern republics, and it could be said to the country as a whole.

[Culic] Let's return again briefly to the problems that you say Croatia can solve with its own resources. Is the Croatian government entering into the talks with the representatives of Serbian districts in Croatia with some concept by which these districts, but other undeveloped districts as well, would see the prospect of solving management problems that are nevertheless common to all?

[Manolic] I must again return to that which I've already said, and that is, that this government cannot find a better concept for the solution to management and other problems in areas settled predominantly with Serbian populations, than the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia. Of course, the Constitution should be implemented through a whole series of subconstitutional acts, and this is the task that now stands directly before us, but the basic legal frameworks that guarantee political, economic, religious and every other equality, are already given in the Constitution. No one must fear that this year, in which laws and other regulations will be passed by which the Constitution is implemented, will put anyone in an unequal position. Not a single law can undermine the rights and freedoms that are guaranteed to all citizens of Croatia, as well as to Serbs, by the Constitution.

[Culic] With the absence of most of the districts from the talks, the resignation of Sima Rajic, and other factors, a question arises as to who can be counted on at all in the future to be representatives of Serbs in Croatia?

[Manolic] Serbian officials must explain to their people why they are not performing their functions or not attending the talks. A normal, civil existence together in the centers where they live is in the interest of the Serbian people, and if individual Serbian officials fail to perform their functions without valid reasons or explanations, they must conclude that this cannot be in the long-term interest of their people, because the people aren't going to be fooled. They remain in the mainstream of life, and that is an internal force that will put many things in their place.

[Culic] Therefore, you think that life in and of itself will put some things in their place and that this track will lead to the resolution of the "Serbian question" in Croatia?

[Manolic] Yes, these internal forces exist in every people and I believe that this instinct and awareness about life will prevail in the end.

Knin Serb Leader on Coexistence of Serbs, Croats
91BA0312A Zagreb START in Serbo-Croatian
19 Jan 91 pp 45-47

[Interview with Dusan Zelembaba, leader of the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS], by Srdjan Spanovic; place and date not given: "Emperor Dusan and His Parish"]

[Text] Dusan Zelembaba, one of the radical leaders of the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS]—the basic generator of the rebellion on Croatian territory—speaks about factions in that organization, explains why he considers the Croatian authority to be Ustasha-oriented and why he does not want to attend meetings of the Croatian Assembly, and explains what he thinks about armament in the area of the so-called Serbian Autonomous Oblast of Krajina, how he looks on the communication of the SFRY State Presidency, and how he sees the influence of Chetnik-Ustasha historical legacies.

[Spanovic] After the conflict with the core of the leadership of the Serbian Democratic Party and after leaving to join the Serbian National Renewal [SNO], you nevertheless returned to the old flock. Why did you leave, and why did you come back?

[Zelembaba] I left to get a look at what the Serbs are thinking on the other side of the Drina.... I left and I came back. No one will ever get me away from Knin again except when I go to visit my mother's grave.

[Spanovic] Were you disappointed, and is that why you came back?

[Zelembaba] I was not disappointed. No, I was not.... I came to the conclusion that the Kosovo in Knin has again become the embodiment of the Serbian Kosovo which is being lost. It is no accident that the Kosovo there is dying and that the Kosovo in Knin is rising again to the Serbian heights. There is some divine providence here.... Knin is now the cradle of Serbism. And that is why I will never leave it again.

[Spanovic] What was the reason for your conflict with the leadership of the SDS and your temporary parting of the ways with the party?

[Zelembaba] It occurred for many reasons. The main one is that Professor Raskovic felt that the people who had joined him in establishing the party perhaps represented some danger for him. That is why he chose collaborators whom I have nothing against, but I am not willing to work with them. He began to push to the sidelines those of us who were with him at the beginning. As to why he did this, perhaps I do not know and perhaps I do not want to say. For the present...

Now we are together once again.... But I think that certain purges have to be carried out in the party's leadership. There is no longer peace when some people think that they are what they are not. Nothing will happen to them, they can remain in the party, they can do their job, but they cannot take those positions which they now have in the SDS.

[Spanovic] To whom specifically are you referring?

[Zelembaba] To Mr. Milan Babic. He attended the communist congress when Jovan Opacic was in prison. It did not at that time occur to him to say at least a word or two in Opacic's defense. It is from that position that he

jumped to the SDS and into its leadership, but the people are quite aware who Jovo Opacic is and who Milan Babic is.

[Spanovic] The opinion prevails among certain influential people in Knin who are not committed to a party and never have been that the whole story of Jovo Opacic was a great local political game on the part of those who assumed changes would occur and did everything to ensure the protection and maintenance of their personal positions. Opacic is well known as a constant critic of the communist system, as someone who is ethnically aware, and he did the job of breaking the ice in creating the basis for what are called the local Serbocommunist to change their political position. What do you know and think about this?

[Zelembaba] It is often said of people from the interior, people outside of Zagreb and Belgrade, that they serve someone, someone's interests. As far as I know, my bosom friend Jovo Opacic and I are serving only the Serbian people. But they always say that someone is manipulating you. No one has manipulated us as yet insofar as we are aware. If there has been any manipulation, we are not skillful enough to have detected it, found out about it, and removed from ourselves all the criticism for something like that.

[Spanovic] Before joining the SDS, were you a member of the League of Communists or of any other political organization?

[Zelembaba] No. Before the SDS, I was not the member of any party, nor would I ever have been the member of any party if political conditions had not become what they are. Along with Jovan Raskovic, Jovo Opacic, and the other gentlemen, I established the Serbian Democratic Party, and I was the one who carried the heaviest load in that action. Later, I was less exposed, but it is well known that I took on a large burden as the founder of the party, and once the burden is taken, it has to be carried.

[Spanovic] Do you have the feeling that even the SDS (just like the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] for that matter) has the syndrome of the presence of a large number of former Communist-Bolsheviks in the leadership?

[Zelembaba] That is true. I think that that is something normal in the early period of development of a multi-party system. The former party members have much more experience and know how to arrive at what they had earlier, positions of leadership which make it possible for them to live well.

[Spanovic] What is your opinion about the life of the Croats and Serbs together? Do you think that it is possible?

[Zelembaba] It is my opinion that they can live together, but also that the present real political situation is such as to afford minimal opportunities for life together.

What I am about to say will perhaps not be to the liking of either Serbs or Croats, but I always think before I speak. Life together is possible only if the psychological barrier between us is removed. The Croats have to renounce Ante Starcevic, father of the homeland, who said that Serbian offspring should be put to the ax, it is necessary that he cease to be the father of the homeland. It is also necessary that the present Ustasha leadership be removed from power....

[Spanovic] You really think that the present democratically elected government in Croatia is an Ustasha-oriented leadership team?

[Zelembaba] I think that what I have said are the conditions which could prejudice life together. Without that, it has no chance.

Let me tell you at once.... I am not a person who thinks that Yugoslavia should be defended at any price, although I love Yugoslavia. Nor am I a man who has anything against the Croatian state. Absolutely nothing.... But let the Croats create that state without the Serbs, without including us.

Yesterday, I talked with a lad who is a delegate in the Bosnian Assembly and with whom I have had many contacts recently. I am getting the hang of politics.... He told me that the surnames which we Serbs have in Knin—Zelembaba, Bjelobaba, Bjelobrka, Malbasa, Mazibrada, Masnokosa, Crnomarkovic, Zutomarkovic—are ancient Slavic, Serbian surnames. I do not place special and unreserved trust in anyone, I only know that Zelembaba exists nowhere in the world except in this valley of ours. In Unesic near Sibenik, there are still Croats who are Serbs converted to Catholicism....

I am not in favor of solving problems with weapons....

[Spanovic] But you were the first to mention weapons, going into the woods....

[Zelembaba] I knew that you would be surprised when I said that! But the only way I can talk with that Ustasha government leadership is over the sights of a gun.... I am talking to you because I feel that you are not an Ustasha!

[Spanovic] What are your arguments to support the assertion that Messrs. Tudjman, Boljkovac, and Manolic, who were even in the Partizans and fought against the Ustashas, have all of a sudden become Ustashas? On what basis do you accuse Slavko Degoricija and Milan Ramljak of Ustashism? Accusations like that, thoughtlessly uttered, could become the subject matter of a court suit, to say the least.

[Zelembaba] They now personify the idea of the father of the homeland. I even allow myself the freedom to think—I hope to God I am not right—that their ultimate goal at this moment is not an ethnically pure Croatian state.

[Spanovic] Does that mean that you think that their goal is to preserve Yugoslavia?...

[Zelembaba] Far from it.... You do not understand me, young man.... I think that they are only one step closer to an ethnically pure state, but the essential thing is not when it will be brought about—in 50, 100, or 200 years. The essential thing for them is to take a significant step. There is no way that they can arrive at that state now. There is no longer Germany and Italy, there is no war, and there are no longer Partizans.... Now all the Serbs are on one side....

[Spanovic] On what basis do you conclude that all the Serbs are united now? Why do you think that even the Croats are absolutely united in their political views and projection of the future?

[Zelembaba] The Croats are not united now, but the Serbian people is. That is the opposite situation of before. I believe in that proposition....

Do you know that there is no longer any need whatsoever for barricades in Knin? No one dares attack us. No one dares! After all, if they attack Knin, a broad front is opened up all the way to the Hungarian border. In 24 or 48 hours, there would be 200,000, 300,000, or 400,000 volunteers in Knin capable of going to Vienna....

[Spanovic] With propositions like that, you did not exactly do famously among the Serbs in Slavonia recently.

[Zelembaba] I did fine in Slavonia, but not in Baranja. So, fine.... There are certain currents in the SDS there.... Nevertheless, do you know what? When you leave an auditorium in a village of 500, and 20 people stay behind you in the auditorium—I do not know who has fared well and who has fared poorly in this case.

[Spanovic] You have mentioned weapons a great deal. Do you carry a pistol?

[Zelembaba] No! I do not carry anything of the kind. I am a physician, a people's doctor.... I would give blood to anyone.... I have not even served in the Army, but, if necessary, I will be with my people!

[Spanovic] Today, every politician appeals to the people....

[Zelembaba] The people has always been there for someone to manipulate it.

[Spanovic] You, of course, think that you have never manipulated the people?!

[Zelembaba] Me? Me manipulate the people? Never in this world! I am an ordinary man, I do not believe that I am braver, but I am a freer man who gathered up his courage to speak in public at a certain point.

[Spanovic] Because you are a physician, a radiologist, and you also work with ultrasound, have you had any unpleasantness with patients because of your political activity? Has there been mistrust on the part of Croats?

[Zelembaba] I am a physician, a specialist, and a man loyal to medicine. I was an excellent student in high school and the university. I was in the fourth year before I failed an examination. For me, a patient is only a patient, and my task is to help him, to cure him. When I go into my office, there are no politics for me, there is only medicine.

I must be honest because recently we have had somewhat fewer people from Drnis coming to the Knin Medical Center, which is probably the most modern in this region and which has the best physicians.... Do you know how friendly the Sibenik Hospital is to the people from Drnis? Like a stepmother to a child! There are slightly fewer people from Drnis and slightly fewer people from Sinj....

But people nevertheless do come! There is no reason not to come to Dr. Zelembaba when from Split, from Dr. Milan Markovic, all the way to far up there, there is no one who will examine a patient with ultrasound the way I will. There is no reason not to come. I took the Hippocratic oath, and I am loyal to it, I live and work by it!

[Spanovic] Do you not have the sense that as a physician you nevertheless sound threatening both to members of other nationalities and to those among the Serbs who do not think like you when you speak about conversation over the sights of a gun?

[Zelembaba] I am not threatening anyone, but I repeat to you, I can talk with that leadership which is now in power in Croatia only over the sights of a gun.

[Spanovic] With whom would you talk?

[Zelembaba] Let them leave the stage, and I also will step down, I will wear only my white physician's smock, and then let some new people take care of politics.

[Spanovic] In Knin, you were democratically elected a deputy in the Assembly by will of the voters. That is the same manner of election of the people in the Croatian Government whom you accuse, contest, and whose withdrawal you demand....

[Zelembaba] They were not elected by the Serbian people....

[Spanovic] Just as you were not by the Croats....

[Zelembaba] If it comes to that, I will tell you something that some people will not like to hear. Yugoslavia was conceived as a Serbian state. That is why it is being torn down by these gentlemen, first the Slovenes and then the Croats. Because that is how they perceive it. A large portion of the people voted for me, and they also voted for Mr. Tudjman.... But the Serbs do not agree with his policy. As soon as the Serbs do not agree, he cannot survive....

[Spanovic] The proposition which you set forth, at least so it seems to me, is a direct argument in favor of Mr. Tudjman and confirms his propositions.

[Zelembaba] No!

[Spanovic] Why not, when you say that the multinational country was conceived as a state for only one nationality?

[Zelembaba] In the state which he has in mind, there is no place for the Serbs, and they are not in favor of it. And that is why he cannot survive. Let him make that state without us. How can that fail to be clear to you!? That little state from the Kupa upward, which now exists, does anyone stand in his way?! No one stands in his way, brother! And without the Serbs no one is holding back the Slovenes either, but they will not go anywhere. You will see, they will not go anywhere!

[Spanovic] Does that mean that you are one of the group of rare Serbian politicians who take the position that in its policy Slovenia actually does not aim at seceding from Yugoslavia, but is only demonstrating its sovereignty, its independence, and its demands within the framework of a Yugoslavia that is possible through a new agreement?

[Zelembaba] Yes. They will never go anywhere! They do not exist without Yugoslavia and without Serbia! Just look.... Let us sit down opposite one another, we do not agree, we talk.... Why would this people be without me or without you? I think that they would be poorer without either one. But if someone wants to go, let him go, but without the Serb territories. And here where I was born, where my grandfathers and great-grandfathers were born, and that means a great deal, this is our land, and there is no one who can carry both it and us. Let them go without us, I have nothing against that. I wish them all the best, I will help them to achieve that independence of theirs.

[Spanovic] You forget that the cradle of the Croatian state is also located in this area.

[Zelembaba] Where? Where does it say that? I never saw it anywhere!

[Spanovic] There are numerous written documents, and still more numerous monuments....

[Zelembaba] That does not exist anywhere.... Take your vacation, and I will take you around and show you that there are no such monuments here.... When is the first Croatian name mentioned in Dubrovnik? To whom does the poet Petar Preradovic belong? And to whom does Gundulic belong? If we cannot agree, then let us call in an international arbitration commission! Not over the issue of who will pay more, but over a scholarly issue!

[Spanovic] They say of you that you are one of the organizers of all the things that happened on the barricades....

[Zelembaba] Me an organizer...God help us! I attended the rally in Nova Pazova when the state of war was proclaimed in Knin last summer. That very moment I sat in the car and drove to Knin to be with my people. In the morning, when I arrived in Knin fully equipped for war...

[Spanovic] As far as you know, was the state of war really proclaimed, or was there a misinterpretation in the transmission of the information?

[Zelembaba] That was no misinformation at all! The state of war was proclaimed! Milan Babic proclaimed the state of war, then he denied it.... Those are, of course, his problems because I was not the one who declared the state of war.

I came to Knin to help my Serbian people and to defend myself. After all, when someone attacks me, I will defend myself so long as I am able. But I will not attack anyone.

If you want my definition of Dr. Zelembaba, I will tell you: I am a vigilante chasing vigilantes! My vigilantism is louder....

[Spanovic] Louder?

[Zelembaba] Louder.... The sound of it carries further.

[Spanovic] What do you think about the order of the SFRY Presidency for return of the weapons held by unauthorized individuals aside from the armed forces and the police?

[Zelembaba] I think that that is a good initiative, but under present conditions it is not practically feasible.

[Spanovic] You think that people will not turn in weapons?

[Zelembaba] No, they will not. I do not know to whom the order specifically applies. Does it apply to the Slovenes who have armed themselves? I think that the order does not apply to the people. Let the gentlemen come and let them disarm the people!

[Spanovic] Does this mean that you do not trust even the SFRY Presidency?

[Zelembaba] Certainly. I am an adherent of the proposition that only an armed people is a free people. Yugoslavia, as it is now, is a cowboy state, and cowboys have to have weapons. I perceive that order as an appeal because the SFRY Presidency long ago lost the power to order anyone to do anything.

[Spanovic] Do you perhaps think that that attempt at disarmament was the prelude to a military takeover?

[Zelembaba] No, I do not. A military takeover cannot be carried out, and if it were carried out, I do not believe that military power would last long.

[Spanovic] What is your opinion of Slobodan Milosevic?

[Zelembaba] Mr. Milosevic and I have never met, but I think that he is above all a stable person, a superb politician. They say he is a communist, but I do not believe that. No one in my house, in my family, was ever a communist, and I think that he is as much a communist as I am. It is just that he was unable to operate under other conditions than communist conditions, and that is clear to many people today.

I will soon be meeting Mr. Milosevic, I want to see what kind of man he is.

[Spanovic] Do you think the politics of the Serbs in Croatia should be conducted in Belgrade?

[Zelembaba] No. Nor does Belgrade conduct our politics. Our politics are conducted by us from Knin. Knin raised up the Serbian people. Our politics are conducted by able and educated young people and academician Raskovic, and our politics are conducted solely in the Krajina, on both sides of the Una—and that means three million people.

[Spanovic] What is your view of the proposition that Franjo Tudjman lifted up Jovan Raskovic and the SDS out of a desire to break up the left-wing block and split the opposition apart because a great number of Serbs in Croatia voted for them?

[Zelembaba] I think that Mr. Raskovic was not created by Mr. Tudjman because Mr. Tudjman is not the man that Mr. Raskovic is. Neither intellectually nor in terms of his reputation with the people....

[Spanovic] You think that Mr. Tudjman does not have prestige with the people?

[Zelembaba] That prestige is forced, that is the work of you newspaper people. I think that it does not exist.

[Spanovic] How would you react if Franjo Tudjman, as the legitimate president of the Republic of Croatia, decided to come to Knin and appeal directly to the people, to his subjects, regardless of nationality? Would you resort to an incident, a provocation?

[Zelembaba] To speak to the people in Knin? If he wants to speak to the people in Knin, then he must bring with him the people to whom he will speak, who will listen to him.

[Spanovic] You think that no one would come?

[Zelembaba] Oh, yes, they would.... Those 10 percent or so of local Ustashas.

[Spanovic] Does that mean that you consider all Croats Ustashas?

[Zelembaba] Well, now, I am joking.... The other day I spent some time with a Croat from Knin. We talked and joked, and I told him he had nothing to be afraid of because for us Croats are like a holy relic. This was in jest.

But if Tudjman wants to speak, he really will have to bring the people with him.

[Spanovic] If the Serbs in Croatia are threatened, then is there not also a threat to the Croats who are in the minority compared to the Serbs, in Knin, Obrovac, Titova Korenica?

[Zelembaba] Can you have forgotten, or do you not remember that a million Serbs lost their lives under the father of the homeland? By whom is it, then, that the Croats feel threatened? This is the soil of Duke Momcilo Djuric, who saved the Serbs from slaughter. Not a single Croat village suffered, except that there was just one act of revenge. One village for revenge because at the beginning of the war Serbian officers returning home were murdered in it.

[Spanovic] You mention an ethnically pure Croatia. Does your policy not lead toward ethnic purity also, in view of the fact that we can anticipate that the Croats will move out of Knin, Obrovac, and Benkovac?

[Zelembaba] No one in Knin has been discharged from office just because he is a Croat or because of the party to which he belongs. To be sure, there are a few Serbs who have been removed, but not a single Croat. That is why I reject all such accusations and insinuations.

[Spanovic] Was anyone in your family a Chetnik?

[Zelembaba] Yes. My uncle was. Commander of a Chetnik brigade.... They say that he was a mountain of a man: Two meters 5 cm tall. I learned who my uncle was only when I was in America and Canada. My late mother never spoke to me about this because she was probably afraid. She knew that I am excitable and sensitive, and she surely was worried that I might go astray, as we used to call it.

[Spanovic] Reevaluation of the historical role of the Chetniks in World War II is becoming increasingly popular among Serbian politicians. Do you not think that the Croats have the right to reevaluate the role of the Ustashas in the same way?

[Zelembaba] Let us be precise! I said that it is only now that I learned who my uncle was. Accordingly, I can speak about the Chetniks only as a reader. Not as a witness or participant in the war.

However, I think that the Chetniks and the Ustashas are not the same thing. The Chetniks fought to preserve the Serbian state, but not a single Croat in Serbia was killed by the Chetniks during the war just because he was a Croat. And the Ustashas were fighting for their state, and they killed a million Serbs in Croatia. Imagine what would have become of the Croatian state today, almost 50 years after the war, if the Ustashas had not killed those million Serbs?!

But now, let me ask you a question because you have put so many to me. How could Mr. Vladimir Seks say on the eve of the Orthodox Christmas that the Serbs can roast

their meat, but they will not have a chance to eat it? What serious person, what politician anywhere in the world, could say something like that! How could that be said on Christmas Eve, and then how can they be amazed when people mobilize, take up arms, all out of fear because of a threat that has been uttered?

People began to organize for defense out of fear, but I was against that. How dare Seks strike a blow at the Serbian people on Christmas Eve? How dare he attack the Serbs at all!?

[Spanovic] Is it true that in the former youth settlement in Golubic there is a staff headquarters directing defensive preparations of your autonomous oblast?

[Zelimbaba] No, no.... I do not know where it is, but when they call me, I will report...(laughing).

[Spanovic] How true are the stories about units that have already been organized and armed on Velebit?

[Zelimbaba] You know how it is—where there is smoke, there is fire. The people can easily be organized, and they are arming themselves.

I personally am against setting up barricades, against going off unnecessarily into the mountains and the like. It is sufficient to see when the local Croats begin to leave their homes. Then it will be clear that something is being prepared.

[Spanovic] Would it not be better for both sides, both the government and the SDS, to show more tolerance, to begin a dialogue and thus avoid the possibility of the worst? Would it not be better for the deputies representing the SDS to attend sessions of the Croatian Assembly and fight for their views by democratic methods?

[Zelimbaba] I do not recognize the present Ustasha government, and I cannot have tolerance for it. Perhaps in the Serbian Democratic Party there are those who have an understanding for that government and who can talk to them, and so let them negotiate and talk. If I were to talk with Mr. Tudjman, I do not know what we would talk about. My views are well known, I do not change them, and I really do not know what the two of us could talk about.

I am a deputy in the Croatian Assembly, but I do not recognize the Croatian Assembly, and I can go to it only on a white horse.

Croatian Social Liberals View Independence

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[Interview with Bozo Kovacevic, lecturer on the sociology of culture in the School of Technology of Zagreb University, by Milan Jajcinovic; place and date not given: "A Maul for Yugoslavia"]

[Text] While many people are simply dragged into politics, Bozo Kovacevic, a 35-year-old lecturer on the sociology of culture in the School of Technology of Zagreb University, entered it with a political position that already had been intellectually polished. As a student, he was a leftist, who, he says, gradually realized that there were blank spots in left-wing intellectual charm and that promotion of that intellectual outlook was unproductive. Kovacevic parted ways with his left-wing activity when he came into conflict with certain colleagues because he did not see the Slovenian turmoil at the time as exclusively a desire for nationalistic exclusiveness, but above all as democratic aspirations. He was brought into politics indirectly by a retired colonel who after some lecture and discussion in Belgrade, before the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts was even heard of, familiarized him with his expansionist appetites. After that, it is said, he returned to Zagreb "utterly crazed" and complained to his former boss Slavko Goldstein, mentioning that perhaps this ought to be opposed by the establishment of a party. Goldstein told him in confidence that he and Vlado Gotovac were working on precisely that and offered him the opportunity to join them. Thus, the core of the Croatian Social Liberal Alliance [HSLS] was formed.

Because Kovacevic's decision to enter politics was "based on moral principles and the responsibility of an intellectual," and because in addition the role of a military man was significant here, we began our conversation with a question of why the Army had become a participant in politics?

[Kovacevic] It is obvious that military circles feel themselves threatened by the development of political events in Yugoslavia. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine the extent to which they are really convinced of the justifiability and truthfulness of the dialectical and historical-materialistic theses proclaimed in the statement of the SSNO [Federal Secretariat for National Defense] which was read in garrisons. It seems that the YPA [Yugoslav People's Army] is still prepared to look upon the USSR as a big brother and is inclined to act in concert with the moves of the Soviet Army. It is obvious that the Army has lost its bearings entirely, because the fact that the film about Spegelj and Boljkovac was shown, demonstrates that the Army does not have the slightest respect for the democratic achievements on our soil. That film belongs, above all, to the kind of intelligence products which are not made public. In my judgment, it was made to justify a military putsch that had already taken place. The fact that the film was made public demonstrates unambiguously that the YPA intended to carry out a military putsch. But the fact that the putsch was not carried out indicates the defeat of the military conception. That defeat is perhaps not definite in the eyes of the top military leadership, but the readiness of the citizens of the Republic of Croatia to resist the military putsch will probably be an argument which will continue to deter the Army from such intentions.

[Jajcinovic] But, regardless of the threats of a military putsch, even in this state which we call normal (with certain reservations) the Army is an increasingly important political factor.

[Kovacevic] It is no longer even going through the motions of respecting the laws, nor does it wish to remain within the limits of the role that has been given it, the role of the duty to defend the country. It has shown that it is an independent political factor and as such is tied up with Borisav Jovic, president of the state, and Slobodan Milosevic, president of Serbia, who, seeing no way of solving the economic and political problems that have accumulated in Serbia, is attempting to turn the attention of the public away from those problems by bringing about war hysteria. It would seem that the syndrome, which we have occasion to monitor in vivo in the Gulf, the syndrome of Saddam Hussein, seized Milosevic long ago. It seems that he sees war as the only way of remaining in power and of not having to pay the bill for the disastrous consequences of his domestic policy. The way things stand now, the Army has consented to that option, completely denying the ideological postulates on which it has functioned up to now, postulates such as brotherhood and unity and the equality of all nationalities and ethnic minorities. The only thing which the YPA has stuck to is the tradition of Serbian and Montenegrin soldiering and the dialectical-historical-materialistic pattern of thought, which makes it impossible for them to catch sight of events in the modern world.

[Jajcinovic] Is it possible to speak generally about the YPA, or are there perhaps differences in the top military leadership?

[Kovacevic] The film about Spegelj refers specifically to those differences. To whatever extent the abandonment of the military putsch was a consequence of the fact that the Americans and English, say, intervene, it is still a consequence of disagreement in the top military leadership itself. That film was undoubtedly made to serve as the justification for a military putsch, and certain military circles, it would seem, were convinced that it would be carried out, and others that it had already been carried out, which is why they gave the film to Belgrade Television for broadcasting.

[Jajcinovic] In Milosevic's desire to preserve Yugoslavia as a form at any price, do you think he is attempting to use the YPA as an instrument, or is that not even necessary?

[Kovacevic] It is hard to say who is serving as an instrument for whom here. The Army is grasping at the straw of salvation, and it sees that straw in the fact that Milosevic, with his militant Nazi-Stalinism, has won the election.

Making a choice among the various possibilities, the top military leadership, in my judgment, judged that Milosevic's conception is nevertheless the closest to what constitutes the ideological core of the Yugoslav People's

Army. And I likewise think that the Army may concur quite easily with Milosevic's view of Yugoslavia as the Great Serbia. In the opinion of certain leading generals, this would make life simpler for the military. Nevertheless, both Milosevic's policy and the policy of the YPA are actually on the defensive. The Army, that is, is using the argument of force as a last resort. What is more, it cannot really decide to use that argument because one of the consequences might mean the very rapid disintegration of the YPA. The ethnic composition of the Army is heterogeneous, but a sizable portion of commissioned officers are on the one hand incompetent and the other not disposed to undertake great risks. And even the YPA has utterly compromised itself because for decades it represented itself as a people's army, but now it would have to move against all the nationalities except the Serbian nationality. These are all elements which instill an element of hesitation in the top military leadership, and they incapacitate it to incline toward the decisions which it would seem are closest to the mental makeup of a majority of those generals.

[Jajcinovic] Many analysts have seen the establishment of a military party as militarization of politics. Is that party in a position to prepare the ground for the kind of Yugoslavia the top military leadership desires?

[Kovacevic] That party would have the purpose of being a fifth column within all five of the other republics. The YPA is trying to copy its model—the Soviet Army—to produce those whom it will call upon to intervene at a particular moment. Nevertheless, one need not be particularly wise to assess the disposition of a majority of the inhabitants of the Yugoslav republics—I do not say Yugoslavia because it hardly exists as a fact worth attention—make it evident that they think differently. What is more, Slovenia, for example, has a very strong territorial defense, while in Croatia the police forces are such that they are an undoubtedly respectable factor. That is why I think that the emergence of the fifth column in Croatia will be invalidated, the fifth column in the form of the newly established party, League of Communists—Movement for Yugoslavia.

[Jajcinovic] Is Yugoslavia, in its present state, a "participant in its own dissolution," that is, if that point should be reached, can there be a peaceful parting of the ways?

[Kovacevic] It is obvious that everyone is dissatisfied with Yugoslavia the way it is. The very fact that all its nationalities are dissatisfied with it could be sufficient grounds for that kind of Yugoslavia to disintegrate. But the problem is not Yugoslavia or not, but Great Serbia or not?

Insistence that all the Serbs live in one state could seem realistic only in those insane conditions in which we are living. If Slobodan Milosevic is already insisting that all Serbs live in one state, if he is insisting on the historical boundaries of Serbia, I do not see why Greece might not also be attached to Serbia because it was also a part of Dusan's empire. But if he wants all Serbs to live together,

I do not know what position he would take toward such a demand by other nationalities in Yugoslavia. It is clear that Milosevic's demand to that effect is absurd because the territories of those potential states would undoubtedly overlap. If he wants all the Serbs to live in the same state, I do not see why, in that case, he could have anything against all the Albanians living in one state. Or if he did after all accept that, I really do not think that that state could be Serbia. So, that rhetoric about all Serbs in one state has absolutely no basis whatsoever, either in political history or in the documents of international conferences or institutions, nor do a majority of the Serbs living outside Serbia feel a need for that. This is in fact a maul with which Yugoslavia is to be broken up. But broken up in such a way that Great Serbia is created in place of Yugoslavia. Incidentally, plans drafted in the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts several years ago envisage the secession of Slovenia and the border of Serbia on the Sutla.

[Jajcinovic] Nevertheless, it seems that the real balance of power does not favor such conceptions?

[Kovacevic] The project of a Great Serbia has no prospects of success, especially now after proclamation of sovereignty not only of Slovenia, but also of Macedonia and of Bosnia-Hercegovina. If the Army plays around with nationalities as it has announced on several occasions, the consequences could be disastrous. That would be the beginning of a civil war, but unquestionably the end of the Yugoslav People's Army, as well. When the only integrative factor of a state is its army, then it is clear that such a state has no promise. To be sure, the moment of its disintegration can be postponed. But with every moment of postponement there is less opportunity for the parting to be conducted peacefully and in a manner acceptable to all nationalities.

[Jajcinovic] With respect to Croatia and its sovereignty, the Croatian Social Liberal Alliance has proposed internationalization of the problem. What would that imply?

[Kovacevic] When the Republic of Croatia confronted the Knin rebellion and the impossibility of its legal authority to resolve the rebellion, the HSLS decided to propose internationalization to the Croatian Parliament and Government. Our Charter on the Independence of the Republic of Croatia contained the proposal that the Croatian Assembly adopt the charter on the independence of Croatia and send a proposal to the assemblies of all the Yugoslav republics that they do the same and thus bring about the preconditions for possibly setting up a confederal Yugoslavia. That proposal of ours also included mediation of international political institutions, European above all, in resolving the Yugoslav crisis. Because those international factors have proven themselves to be more than effective in the case of German unification, there is no reason to assume that their influence in the case of Yugoslavia's division would be less creative and effective. Our idea was that it would be far better to use the services of European diplomatic factors than call up the blue helmets after a civil war

broke out. Our point of departure was the position that the present republic borders are inviolable, which then signifies the inviolability of Yugoslavia's external borders, so as to remain in that way within the provisions of the Helsinki Declaration.

[Jajcinovic] Why was your proposal misplaced?

[Kovacevic] It seems to us that the top leadership of the Republic of Croatia did not pay sufficient attention to our proposal. Probably because the new Constitution to some extent eliminates the need for proclaiming a separate charter of independence. But on the other hand the question of the independence of the Republic of Croatia, and thereby also of its sovereignty, has still not been resolved. During and after the election campaign the ruling party promised much more than a mere declaration of sovereignty, but in fact we are still highly dependent upon a Yugoslav framework that has become loose and shaky, but still exists.

[Jajcinovic] What is the reason for that discrepancy?

[Kovacevic] Certainly we should not forget the fact that Croatia's Territorial Defense has for all practical purposes been disarmed and for a long time the republic did not possess instruments for defense of its sovereignty. That is probably the main reason why the top republic leadership held back from proclaiming sovereignty overnight. But now that initial weakness has been removed, I must admit that it is not clear to me why this decision on independence was not made immediately after 25 January, when it was clear that the Army and the Serbian leadership did not want to recognize Croatia's right to independence. I nevertheless hope that the Croatian leadership will take steps in that direction. I must also say in this connection that we in the Croatian Social Liberal Party have had reliable information to the effect that the Government of Great Britain would have recognized the Republic of Croatia if a decision on its independence had passed in the last extraordinary session of the Croatian Assembly.

[Jajcinovic] Isn't the decision not to proclaim sovereignty yet perhaps due to the problem of Knin, that is, the problem of the segment of Serbs in Croatia, that has been one of the elements behind the decision to go to Belgrade nevertheless?

[Kovacevic] I think that one of the elements in that deal between the Croatian president and the Army was the agreement that what we might call the Croatian and Serbian extremes in Croatia would be given equal treatment. Unfortunately, an appropriate report to that effect was not submitted to the Assembly, and because neither the Assembly nor the general public knows anything about this, I know nothing either. But if such an agreement was in fact reached, it was betrayed even in its very first hours. As for the Knin problem, it is clear that the persistence and brutality with which the leadership of Knin Opstina and the leadership of the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] have carried out their decisions demonstrate that they do not have support outside Knin

itself. And there is no question that this is the support of the YPA or at least some circles within it. And for its part, the Army is using Knin as an element for blackmailing the Croatian Government every time the discussion turns on Croatia. It is important, then, to assure the representatives of all the Yugoslav republics except Serbia (because it hardly will be possible to conduct reasonable talks with its leadership) that the Army, as an independent political factor, represents a danger for all the republics. It is necessary, then, to do everything to neutralize the Army as a political factor. At the same time, the leadership of the Republic of Croatia must continue to achieve international legal recognition of Croatia at any price. When it achieves that recognition of itself as an entity in international law, then those means which up to now have not been at its disposal, can be used in resolving the Knin crisis.

[Jajcinovic] Are the means of repression being referred to among those means?

[Kovacevic] I do not advocate the use of violence at any price. Certainly not. But violence cannot be answered forever with appeals.

[Jajcinovic] Must the Croatian State recognize the rights even of those who do not want to recognize it?

[Kovacevic] The only condition which must be met by all citizens of Croatia is that they acknowledge and respect the Government of Croatia established by the Constitution. This does not mean that every citizen must agree with the policy of the party in power. He must have the opportunity to commit himself to opposition and to state his position publicly, but it also means that all of that must be done within the limits of the law. The only problem with the advocates of Serbian political autonomy is that they do not want to recognize the right of the Republic of Croatia to independence and its laws. I feel that no reasonable person in Croatia has anything against the existence of one or several Serbian parties, against the Serbs using Cyrillic as an official written language in opstinas where they are in the majority, and against their developing their national culture. However, every normal citizen, regardless of his ethnic background, has many reasons to oppose the lawlessness advocated by Babic and Raskovic. So, the problem of the attitude toward the SDS and toward the Knin Serbs is not that the Croats would not recognize Serbian national rights, but that certain circles within the SDS and Serbian National Council do not recognize the right of the Croatian nationality to have its own state, nor do they recognize the laws of that state.

[Jajcinovic] In such a situation, how is the sovereignty of Croatia to be established over the entire territory?

[Kovacevic] I think that there is no problem with a majority of the Serbian people in Croatia. The problem of sovereignty will be a lasting one precisely with respect to Knin. It is my opinion that Knin should cease to be the central point of Croatian policy. The Government of the Republic of Croatia and other authorities have a number of more urgent matters—primarily with respect to the

economy and achieving international legitimacy. Knin is just one of the problems which will be lasting ones, but which, I assume, will be mitigated in time. If the economy functions, if the life of society in Croatia functions, then that could be an element that would attract a good number even of those Serbs who today are inclined to believe the inventions being spread abroad primarily by the Belgrade media. In that case, Knin will remain an isolated enclave. What is more, I feel that repressive measures envisaged by the law should be implemented against all those who violate the laws, regardless of whether they are Serbs or Croats.

[Jajcinovic] We are witnesses that almost every enforcement of the law against the Serbs in Croatia is interpreted as repression of the "Ustasha government." It seems that it is not possible, especially today, so long as the "media war" lasts, to avoid such distorted interpretations.

[Kovacevic] Until Croatia achieves full sovereignty, that fact will be very important. But if Croatia had recognition under international law, then what the Belgrade media or Serbian authorities say would belong to the sphere of international relations and would not have such direct internal political consequences as they have now.

[Jajcinovic] Is international recognition of Croatia truly a reality or only a desire?

[Kovacevic] The statements of certain Western politicians do not really favor the Republic of Croatia. In part, perhaps, this is a consequence of the undefined policy of Croatia itself. That is, I think that the moves by a portion of the Yugoslav Presidency, the top leadership of the Army, and especially the Serbian leadership, are such that they have destroyed even the remaining possibility of Yugoslavia's existence as it has been up to now. The question of confederation is now no longer one of the possibilities, but that minimum which must be achieved to ensure the dignity of the non-Serb nationalities in such a state. And a prerequisite for confederation is the independence of the states that will make it up, and that is a fact which I believe the relevant international factors will recognize. Some of the conversations which I have had, not, to be sure, with congressmen, but with high officials of the American Congress, suggest the conclusion that it is not altogether without promise that the State Department might change its present official view. I must say that the fact that the Communists have been victorious in Serbia and Montenegro has contributed to that. Let us understand one another; even though the Communists have won, in my judgment, this is no longer the same political system as it was because they have been elected in free elections. However, it is nevertheless a fact that the Americans and the entire Western world would rather cooperate with a noncommunist party in power. That constitutes an important comparative advantage for Croatia. A further consolidation of economic ties, which has now begun with Austria, and I believe it will continue with other states as well, will signify a greater move on Croatia's part toward the Western world. I might say, then, that the conditions for proclamation of Croatia's independence are falling into place more and more.

YUGOSLAVIA

Tudjman Adviser on Croatian Arms Acquisition

91BA0284A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 5 Feb 91 pp 12-13

[Article by Dr. Mario Nobile, adviser to the president of the Republic of Croatia: "How Arms Have Been Imported"—first paragraph is DANAS introduction]

[Text] What follows is an excerpt from a book entitled *Rat protiv Hrvatske* [The War Against Croatia], which will go on sale in one week.

The Croatian police decided to import armament after the YPA [Yugoslav People's Army] completely disarmed Territorial Defense and after its request was refused by the Administration for Purchases and Sales of Armament and Military Equipment, "which are centralized operations." It is true that NARODNA ARMIJA has published copies of responses of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense to the request of the Croatian Ministry of Internal Affairs for the purchase of several thousand rifles, automatic rifles, submachine guns, pistols, and ammunition, from which it is evident that they were not definitively rejected, but the possibility of the purchase was postponed to the end of 1991 at the earliest. NARODNA ARMIJA, however, is publishing a response to the renewed insistence of the Ministry of Internal Affairs on the delivery of several hundred pistols and 100 automatic rifles ordered by the previous government, and the headline states in boldface that "the contract could be concluded immediately." One page further on, Zastava denies the allegations of Janez Jansa that deliveries were also refused Slovenia, with the assertion that Slovenia "unilaterally canceled the contracts concluded several months before Croatia requested additional amounts." If this denial by Zastava is correct, then the argument is not valid that the full employment of capacity and the production schedule stood in the way of deliveries to Croatia.

NARODNA ARMIJA cites as the crowning proof of the "obvious conspiracy in collusion with the foreign factor" that "in SR [Socialist Republic] Croatia, fast work is being done to portray the arms imported on commission and distributed among members of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] as weapons of law enforcement agencies, which is a maneuver to retain those weapons and to legalize an illegal military organization."

It is evident from the 17 January 1991 report of the inspectorate of the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs (it was sent to establish the actual status of active and reserve law enforcement personnel and their armament, and to offer help in carrying out the order of the Presidency), signed by Jovan Vuckovic, assistant in the Federal Secretariat, and Josip Boljkovac, minister of internal affairs of the Republic of Croatia, that the following were missing from the weapons of the active and reserve law enforcement forces: 500 pistols, 14,250 pistols, 77 revolvers, 61,262 semiautomatic rifles, 487

PASP, 19,688 AP rifles, 2,561 submachine guns, five machine guns, 397 bazookas, 50,372 hand grenades, and 31,453 rifle grenades. It is estimated that the YPA confiscated from the Croatian Territorial Defense more than 200,000 rifles and pistols and numerous combat kits.

The armament which Croatia has imported, although irregular from the standpoint of customs formalities (duty is not paid on arms), was imported for its legitimate authorities in quantities which are not sufficient even for its police, not to mention the "army of the HDZ." Croatian Government authorities are refusing for the present to state precise figures on the source from which the arms were procured because of the difficulties which individuals and foreign trade firms could have. In any case, the campaign against Astra as an arms smuggler did great damage to the business reputation of that firm, especially on the Soviet market, and Genex is now trying to jump into its place.

For months now, Croatia has made it no secret that it had imported certain quantities of arms for its police, but by no means the 37,000 weapons referred to in the charge by "well-informed" POLITIKA or the documentary film of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense, but approximately the number requested from Zastava, as confirmed by the federal inspectorate. The finding of the inspection by the commission of the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs found the customs status irregular for 5,000 M-75 "CZ" pistols made in Czechoslovakia, 6,000 kalashnikov AK-47's made in the Soviet Union, and 300 SAR rifles made in the United States. From the material made public in the film and in NARODNA ARMIJA, it is evident that most of the documents are not authentic. A close reading of those documents easily shows that they were planted, but this does not worry the authors, since a majority of the shocked public—many people are looking at an unclear facsimile of an international bill of lading for the first time—still did not suspect the authenticity of the documents. The most important thing is the ultimate effect—the military intervention—and if it does not succeed, then let the Croatian side spend months "explaining"!

The document from Astra is probably authentic, but it is evident from the text that this is only a request, an inquiry as to the possibility of importing 20,000 Kalashnikovs, not importation that took place. The same is true of Boljkovac's letter to the Spanish manufacturer. The international bill of lading made public, in which Cazmatrans is given as the carrier, does not indicate what kind of article was involved, and an incriminating question mark is put in place of the name of the article in the translation of the document. This, then, could be any load carried by Cazmatrans. It is not evident anywhere in the public letters of the English and Israeli firms that they are answering a request of the Croatian Ministry of Internal Affairs, but only the "Yugoslav police" is mentioned. Nor does the armament referred to correspond to the armament found to have been purchased by the Croatian police according to the federal inspectorate.

The conclusion might be the following: Not only did KOS [Counterintelligence Service] decide on sensationalist publication of dubious and planted documents which were supposed to provoke a civil war, but it displayed extreme professional incompetence. After all, if they had the information they are making public, to the effect that an importation of arms into Croatia was being prepared, then they are really dilettantes if they did not manage to discover the source of the arms, the importer, and the participants, or seize a few rifles, in spite of the carefully organized hunt for the trucks carrying the arms. Given their experience, their numbers, and the abundant funds allocated to them, some of them out of Croatia's pocket, they really did a sloppy, but dangerous job.

The mystery of the imported armament will for a time continue to tickle the curious public, but the Federal Secretariat for National Defense has refrained from filing charges for "arming terrorist groups in Croatia" through an illegal importation of arms and "probably with drugs as well" (Why does it seem that we have heard this before?) Attention is now concentrated on the "promised arrests," which aside from the main Croatian leaders are also supposed to include the Slovenian leaders and indeed the federal prime minister Markovic. It all fits perfectly into the statement by General Adzic, who said "so what if a few thousand heads roll, the world will hum for a week and then forget it."

Data on Ethnic Makeup of YPA Analyzed

91BA0284B Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 5 Feb 91
pp 16-17

[Article by Vlatko Cvrtila: "Who Is What in the Armed Forces"]

[Text] An analysis of most of the known and accessible data shows, at first, serious differences between the present "ethnic distribution" of the officer corps of the YPA [Yugoslav People's Army] and the ideal numerical distribution that would correspond to the proportions of the various nationalities and ethnic minorities.

There are many more officers who are Serbs, Montenegrins, Macedonians, and Yugoslavs. There are many fewer Croats, Muslims, Slovenes, Albanians, Hungarians, and others. There are half as many Croats, Muslims, and Hungarians, one-third as many Slovenes and "others," and in the case of Albanians one-sixth as many, with officer's shoulder boards than there might be.

It might be judged that people from the eastern parts of Yugoslavia or from the less developed parts are readier to become commissioned officers than those from the more advanced western republics—were it not for the drastic disproportion in the number of Albanians (the least developed) or the Muslims.

It is well known that "the Serb has a liking for the army," including the Serb from Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia (he is even the first to do so, which comes down from the military, police, and militia traditions of the

krajina)...but it is also evident from these figures that the ethnic distribution has been upset quite considerably—the distribution which the YPA has been trying to achieve. So if we know that the Croats and Slovenes are reluctant to go into the military, we also know that they have had more and more motives in recent decades in view of the economic crisis, and when a man becomes a commissioned officer he has a safe job, a salary, and what other professions do not have at all—a place to live.

The ethnic question is already quite important for this kind of complicated composite state. That is, ethnicity is very often used as a pattern in recruiting members of the state apparatus for coercion (the police and the army). The tendency (declarative) in enrolling candidates for the coercive agencies is toward representative distribution of all ethnic groups according to the distribution of the various nationalities or ethnic minorities in the total population. In the socialist countries, much propaganda use was made of the manner (plebeian) of recruiting the professional army in assertions about the "people's" army, about an army in which all the nationalities and ethnic minorities were represented; one which on that basis was more democratic than the army of "rotten" capitalism, and to the effect that building the army of the "new" type was the greatest achievement of civilization, and so on.

However, the reality is utterly different. Thus, our army (state) conducted a selective personnel policy in enrolling the professional army. The tendency was to enroll for schooling and promotion to the rank of commissioned officers persons with a "worker-peasant" origin, from poor families for whom the army became "both mother and father." In the literature concerned with these matters, this process is referred to as plebification of the officer corps.

The 1974 SFRY Constitution stated that because of the multinational composition of society, in the recruitment of the professional officer corps and promotions to high command positions, and in the achievement of high ranks in the YPA, "respect should be paid to the principle of uniform representation of the republics and autonomous provinces" (Article 242). This proportionality is mainly respected, most of all among the generals, while the pattern is quite different among officers at the lower level.

Ethnic Composition of the Officer Corps in 1981
(in percent)

Nationalities and Ethnic Minorities	Distribution of Population (a)	Distribution of Regular Army (b)	(b) as a percentage of (a)
Montenegrins	2.5	6.2	248
Croats	22.1	12.6	57
Macedonians	5.8	6.3	108
Muslims	8.4	2.4	28
Slovenes	8.2	2.8	34
Serbs	39.7	60.0	151
Albanians	6.4	0.6	9

**Ethnic Composition of the Officer Corps in 1981
(in percent) (Continued)**

Nationalities and Ethnic Minorities	Distribution of Population (a)	Distribution of Regular Army (b)	(b) as a percentage of (a)
Hungarians	2.3	0.7	30
Yugoslavs	1.3	6.7	515
Others	3.3	1.6	48

Source: *Podruzbljanje varnosti in obrambe*, 1983-84, RK, ZSMS, Ljubljana, p 18

It is evident from these figures that the distribution of the armed forces is not representative of the ethnic distribution of Yugoslavia (today, the situation is probably somewhat different to the disadvantage of those nationalities which in this table are "lagging behind" when it comes to ethnic distribution and the share of that nationality in the total population and in the officer corps of the YPA). This could be influenced by various social processes, by the economic condition of various regions, by the history of some nationality, and so on. However, even when these influences are taken into account, in Yugoslavia that distribution is affected more by political reasons and the secret government and military planning of the makeup of the armed forces. This was manifested in the verification

of the origin of members of the various nationalities back three generations and in the less enthusiastic advertising for the military calling in certain parts of Yugoslavia, and in other actions. In order to homogenize this diverse composition of the army, the officer corps of the YPA went through severe ideological torture, they were required to join the ruling party and study Marxism as a view of the world and as the determining approach to all civilian and military questions. Thus, even today, now that the LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia] is no longer in power and has left the historical scene, an attempt is being made to revive the work of the communist forces in the new party LCY-PY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia—Movement for Yugoslavia] (which some refer to in jest as the YPA—Movement for Yugoslavia), and in the armed forces they are once again enrolling all officers (or most of them) in the unified party.

The unrepresentative ethnic distribution of the YPA (although we do not neglect it) is not the biggest problem of the armed forces; it is its insistence, even to the point of using arms, on halting the build-down of communist systems and their renewed establishment on this soil, even by force. There will be no peaceful discussions, negotiations, and agreements in Yugoslavia until the position and behavior of the armed forces in those negotiations are first cleared up.

	Generals		Colonels		Lieutenant Colonels		Majors	
	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual
Montenegrins	Almost 5-fold too many		4-fold too many		Almost 3-fold too many		2.5-fold too many	
	4	19	60	257	158	411	90	225
Croats	Almost 30% short		More than 50% short		50% short		50% short	
	30	22	463	219	1212	661	692	364
Muslims	Almost 80% short		1/7 of ideal		1/5 of ideal		1/4 of ideal	
	14	3	209	28	548	109	313	82
Macedonians	33% too many		26% short		8% too many		30% too many	
	9	12	140	103	366	394	209	236
Slovenes	Equal		60% short		Less than 1/3 of ideal		1/4 of ideal	
	12	12	183	72	480	142	274	68
Serbs	38% too many		Almost 2-fold too many		75% too many		65% too many	
	56	77	850	1,511	2,228	3,896	1,272	2,102
Albanians	1/12 of ideal		Less than 1/35 of ideal		Less than 1/30 of ideal		1/33 of ideal	
	12	1	181	5	474	15	271	8
Hungarians	Nothing		1/7 of ideal		Less than 1/7 of ideal		Slightly more than 1/5 of ideal	
	3	—	44	6	117	15	67	14
Yugoslavs	Approximately equal		Approximately equal		About 25% too many		Almost 2-fold too many	
	8	7	127	123	334	422	191	360
Others	Nothing		Less than 1/4 of ideal		1/3 of ideal		Slightly over 1/3 of ideal	
	6	—	84	18	221	73	126	46

Source: *Rat protiv Hrvatsk*, by Dr. Slaven Letica, professor, and Dr. Mario Nobile, which is going on sale in one week.

BULGARIA

French Firm Seeks Agricultural Contacts *91BA0259A Sofia ZEMYA in Bulgarian 3 Jan 91 p 2*

[Interview with Svetla Kondakova, head of the Bulgarian office of the French chemical corporation Rhone-Poulenc, by Rumyana Yordanova; place and date not given: "We Seek Contacts With Anyone"]

[Text] Alet, Rovral, Mikal, Quartz-Super, Ronstar, Azulox, and Modaon are meaningless words to the uninitiated. However, agronomists and plant protection specialists in our country would unfailingly identify them as belonging to the French company Rhone-Poulenc. It will soon be a quarter of a century since that company entered the Bulgarian market with the first Agriya pesticide, Fuzolon.

In the fall of 1990, Rhone-Poulenc opened an office in Sofia. The gallantry of the French was once again emphasized with the offer made to Miss Svetla Kondakova to become its director.

[Yordanova] What does this choice indicate?

[Kondakova] Professionalism, I hope. However, it also indicates trust in Bulgarian specialists to assume full responsibility.

[Yordanova] What are the main distinguishing features of your company?

[Kondakova] Rhone-Poulenc is one of the biggest chemical corporations in the world and one of the most famous. Its agrarian sector has an annual sales figure of 10.5 billion French francs [Fr] and employs 8,000 workers. The company is in second place in European trade in agrochemicals. It is also one of the few to maintain a high work standard in synthesizing new preparations because this is an exceptionally expensive and science-intensive activity. The development of a preparation, from molecule to market, costs no less than \$100 million. One of the basic objectives of the company is to not only produce a wide range of high-quality pesticides but also to prevent any risks or compromises concerning their ethical use.

[Yordanova] Rhone-Poulenc has already carved its own perimeter in Bulgarian farming. What aspects concern you?

[Kondakova] I shall be frank: the lack of funds, foreign exchange, both on the part of the TKZS [labor cooperative farm] and enterprises providing agrochemical services, and private farmers. This is the biggest obstacle. It is bad that we cannot see clearly the means by which such funds could be procured quickly. I am convinced that, until the domestic convertibility of the leva has been approved, no great advances will be made.

[Yordanova] Could the French partners help?

[Kondakova] Yes, the firm is ready to grant credits. Our economic director was ready to come to Sofia for discussions. At the present time, however, we are unable to find a bank that would guarantee the risks. Furthermore, once again the lack of modern legislation automatically makes any initiative on the part of foreign firms risky.

[Yordanova] Do you have reasons for hinting at the existence of risks?

[Kondakova] In a certain sense, I do. Some Bulgarian organizations owe Rhone-Poulenc something like Fr2 million. However, this is not a decisive feature in our relations. The firm is familiar with their difficulties.

[Yordanova] Nonetheless, do you see a way to surmount the present obstacles?

[Kondakova] Yes. I believe that barter deals are what we shall begin with. We are making efforts to develop several centers in the country that would bring together the efforts and wishes of the TKZS, the cooperatives, private farmers, agrochemical service enterprises, associations, and others. We intend to develop our own teams for information, services and trade, the training of specialists, marketing, and so forth. The firm considers Bulgaria a very promising partner and is ready to invest in our country. We are discussing matters with everyone. We are ready to offer advice and technical aid. That is why we are sending a message to all consumers of agrochemical products. If they seek out Rhone-Poulenc, they will have a loyal, accurate, and tolerant partner.

Audit Results of Stara Zagora Disk Plant

*91BA0255A Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian
20 Dec 90 p 2*

[Article by Svetlana Popova: "In the Case of the Jokers at 'Disk Memory Systems,' the Bosses Were Gambling Big"]

[Text] The audit conducted at the DZU [Disk Memory Systems] Company in Stara Zagora was completed last October. The results of the audit, however, remained tucked away at the Ministry of Finance. However, the fog surrounding this company thickened, and the concern shown by its personnel has been legitimately growing. That is why we decided to make part of the audit results public.

On the basis of a contract with Mineralbank, dated May 1985, the DZU Company was granted a loan of 2,484,000 leva in foreign currency. The loan was to be repaid with savings on planned foreign exchange expenditures for importing microengines, the production of which was undertaken locally after the loan was obtained. While the audit was under way, however, the debt rose to 3,914,000 leva. Simply, the interest owed had increased because Atanas Atanasov, the general director, and Dragomir Draganov, head of the accounting, credit, and foreign exchange department, had failed to start repaying the loan....

Instead of repaying Mineralbank, the aforementioned gentlemen invested foreign currency in Germany. Fifty thousand deutsche marks were put into each of the following: Elektronik Company (Frankfurt), which is fully owned by the DZU, and the Wilux Company (Berlin), of which the DZU is a half-owner.

According to the audit, "the sums of \$12,397,359 and \$9,757,325 in convertible rubles were deposited in the foreign exchange bank accounts, for which there has been no recorded accountability and which were not included in the company's balance sheet."

According to the audit, the following were financed out of the RTO [Development and Technical Support] Fund, the purpose of which is to provide guarantees: the premises of the mayoralty in Byal Izvor Village (200,000 leva), a warehouse in Stara Zagora (100,000 leva), the Olympic Committee (100,000 leva), the Hunting and Fishing Union (60,000 leva), the Equestrian Federation, the Bicycle Federation, the Beroe Soccer Club, and other partners, deemed important in terms of the company's output and prosperity. About 98,000 convertible rubles were spent on bringing in three Polish equestrian specialists and two Soviet women basketball players. Facilities for marksmanship, the insurance of horses, and foreign assignments to athletes were not forgotten, either.

According to the audit, New Year's bonuses did not bypass the chiefs of the DZU, after the particularly controversial 1987. In an unnumbered and undated letter addressed to V. Kolarov, Bulgarian National Bank chairman, General Director A. Atanasov suggested, and the latter, through a resolution written on the letter itself and not in an answering letter, with a date and registration number issued by the Bulgarian National Bank, answered, agreeing that bonuses totaling 820,000 leva be paid out of the Economic Risk Fund for successful operations in 1987. Other specific awards from the Economic Risk Fund were also appropriated for 1988 results—141,000 leva, of which Atanasov received 1,160 leva, and Stefan Stoev, the head of the Labor and Cadre Department, 840 leva.

Here is another interesting financial operation. With a bank foreign exchange note, dated 26 May 1989, the DZU Company purchased \$2.88 million from Kinteks, which, at the official rate of exchange at that time, was the equivalent of 4,835,600 leva. However, according to the foreign exchange agreement, 28 million leva were paid out. The dollars were immediately sold to the state through the Foreign Trade Bank for 4,835,600 leva. The difference in the leva equivalence, or 23,165,000 leva, was pocketed by Kinteks and distributed among the company branches.

Here is another shady deal with international participation. In July 1989, the DZU transferred \$10,000 to the Coni-Technology Company, represented by Nisim Koen. No supporting documents for this transfer had been submitted by the time of the audit. The auditors

were told that this currency was used to pay for airplane tickets purchased by Mr. Koen for a round-trip from Italy to Austria and from Vienna to Varna on assignment by the DZU for Atanas Atanasov and Mitko Matev, systems director; Rafael Sarkisyan, deputy general director (today general director); and Georgi Marinov and Ivan Kulin, company plant directors in Silistra and Razlog, respectively.

However, according to Order No. 13,193 of 18 May 1989 concerning the above-mentioned trip, the round-trip tickets had been prepaid.

Zhivko Zhelev, one of the "heroes" of this Stara Zagora epic, had a strong affinity for a German company, inasmuch as this gentleman made deals exclusively with it, regardless of how profitable they were to the DZU. When the purchasing of a fax machine became necessary, Mr. Zhelev procured it from said company, although it was a used one and soon afterwards had to be repaired. Its price equaled that of a high-quality product—DM31,750—or higher than a new machine bought from a competitor would have cost. The procurement of a copier, arranged once again by Zhelev from his favorite company, cost DM9,400 more than the price asked by another partner. The deal with the so-called disk procurements was particularly profitable to the German company. Although the price advertised by a competitor was DM20 per piece, thanks to Zhivko Zhelev, our country paid DM145 each. That company's profits were increased, our specialist made sure, by padding the cost of a vacuum machine by \$419,206, as the audit confirmed.

The names of the foreign partners of the Bulgarian electronic pseudogiant have been deliberately omitted because I have agreed to Mr. Nisim Koen's recommendation to protect the company's reputation. The only violation is making public the names of foreign companies in which DZU participates with its own capital.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CSFR Commission Writing New Commercial Code

*91CH0308D Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY
in Czech 9 Jan 91 p 13*

[Interview with Stanislav Stuna, professor at the College of Economics, by Vaclav Vopicka; place and date not given: "The Birth of a Commercial Code"]

[Text] Law by law, an entirely new corpus of laws has come into being in the economic sphere of our country this past year—a commercial code. After decades of the current commercial code, as well as other important laws and decrees that have had a more or less efficient impact on economic development, the new code will fully codify the regulations governing the legal status of players in a market economy: entrepreneurs, businessmen, and small business owners.

Even a cursory glance at the proposed code shows that these are the most extensive changes in the code since 1945. The new code is intended to replace or eliminate roughly 70 existing laws and other regulations in this area. In addition to the commercial code and international business code all basic conditions of product deliveries, services, etc. will be modified. With more than 800 paragraphs (the current commercial code has half this number, and the civil code has about 500), the commercial code will be our most extensive set of statutes.

A special CSFR government commission has already been working many months to draft the code. This commission has been chaired by Stanislav Stuna, candidate for doctor of science (CSc.), doctor of law, professor at the College of Economics. We visited Professor Stuna for this interview.

[Vopicka] Clearly, professor, this represents a significant intrusion into an entire, obviously very important branch of our legal order.

[Stuna] The new code will have an impact on a truly wide range of commercial relationships, i.e., relationships that arise during business ventures and among entrepreneurs. Understandably, it will not be a complete codification, rather it will concentrate on certain basic institutions. In this sense the commercial code will be linked to the general arrangement of the civil code, which is also awaiting a relatively extensive update. The civil code, after all, will be the fundamental legal document codifying the principles of property relations in our society. This includes issues of legal identity, legal behavior, contracts, etc. In this sense we are actually restructuring our entire legal order in both the civil and public areas. These codifications of both the civil and the commercial codes will have an impact on the area traditionally known as civil law. The commercial code will be a special regulation that codifies specific problems in entrepreneurship and business, while the civil code will be a basic regulation covering the area of property relationships, containing mainly a uniform codification of ownership law.

[Vopicka] Which participants in business relationships will the code deal with?

[Stuna] Practically all entrepreneurs. Specific sections, for instance, related to contract law will include mutual relationships among entrepreneurs. In some cases involving so-called pure business deals, the commercial code applies to all participants in such deals. An example is business conducted on exchanges. One can divide entrepreneurial entities into several categories. First are the individual entrepreneurs and corporations. The commercial code also covers direct entrepreneurship by foreign entities in Czechoslovakia, as long as the foreign entity conducts business here through its domestic branches and facilities. This will not apply to joint ventures, which are businesses founded according to our laws.

Otherwise we will distinguish among other categories of entrepreneurs, namely those entered in the enterprise register. We call these entrepreneurs businessmen in the commercial code. There is also a category of small scale entrepreneurs, namely those who are only registered at the business office. We refer to them as small business owners. We also want to codify all types of business corporations, namely sole proprietorships (known earlier as public business associations), limited partnerships, limited stock partnerships, limited liability partnerships, and corporations. The commercial code is also intended to contain a uniform code to apply to all cooperatives.

[Vopicka] Will this mean basic changes in the operation of current contractual relationships among entities covered by the current commercial code. Today we call these supplier-customer relations?

[Stuna] The entire system of contract law, which has come to include the current concept of supplier-customer relations, will change quite significantly. The basic principle of a market economy will be contractual freedom. In this area we are trying to provide enough so-called disposition regulations to cover cases in which the parties to a contract forget to resolve one issue or another. I think that this will be the area of greatest difficulty for our work until we master both new types of contracts as well as an overall new structure resting on contracts as the basic institution for business relationships between entrepreneurs.

The dominant type of contract under the new commercial code will be a specific procurement contract that reflects the current status of the business law unification process. Basic contract types, which include the purchase contracts, project contracts, rental contracts, etc., will be included in the commercial code. The commercial code will specify only those issues specific to business, namely for relations between entrepreneurs. At the same time we are trying not only in the area of customer law, but also in the overall formation of the commercial code, to base decisions as much as possible on the unification efforts that have proceeded quite far within the European Community, thus leaving us with a number of models for future supranational legal codes.

[Vopicka] The new code will certainly include some provisions quite unknown to the current generation of employees as well as lawyers.

[Stuna] Understandably, the commercial code will include a number of provisions that have been previously unknown in our legal codes, or which had been specified very superficially or generally. One of these is the question of trade secrets and penalties for violating them, a similar codification of the regulations for economic competition, or more precisely stated friendly competition, and the results of such behavior. The code will specify the entirety of so-called partners law, which is how we refer to laws covering relations between partners and a business entity. This will include issues of partner contributions, shares, division of property and

profits, compensation for partnership losses, etc. We are trying, to the extent possible during the time allowed, to incorporate some basic laws covering the position of stock exchanges, exchange trades, and exchange brokers. So far, however, we have not agreed whether or not to include in the code the specific issue of securities, which must also be passed by the legislature in the requisite time frame.

[Vopicka] Does the commercial code touch on the mutual relations between citizens, as customers, and businessmen and small business owners regarding the performance of services?

[Stuna] As I have already stated, the commercial code will not resolve property relations among citizens, or between entrepreneurs and citizens as their customers. These issues are dealt with by the civil code. They are updated comprehensively by a new version of this code which is ready to be discussed at the same time or earlier than the draft of the commercial code.

[Vopicka] How long do you estimate it will take to draft, debate in the legislative bodies, and pass the commercial code?

[Stuna] Understandably, more time could be spent on a draft of the commercial code. But in view of the fact that in the near future a number of measures will be taken to introduce a market economy mainly by privatizing current government enterprises, it is essential that the commercial code be passed as soon as possible, even though we will know that it is not completely ideal. The commercial code is also very important for strengthening the legal certainties of investors, who are accustomed to certain standards in business law. A different code, or the complicated current temporary, would cause great trouble if left in place.

The time schedule looks like this. Recently, comment sessions were held on the first version of the commercial code. I can say with satisfaction that there were many positive comments that we plan to use and that have helped our work immensely. Before the end of February a version of the code should exist that can be discussed in the government. We would like the code to take effect beginning on 1 July of this year. The problem is that such an extensive code cannot take effect on the day after, or even ten days after it is announced. We are trying to have at least a three month period between the publication of the code and when it takes effect. This would require, however, that it be discussed in the Federal Assembly either in March or early April.

The commission that is drafting the code is comprised of people from all sectors and was set up by direct authority of the Federal Government Legislative Council. The commission included employees from the area of theory, i.e. colleges and research institutes, as well as blue collar workers. We are placing great emphasis on discussing the code with appropriate interest groups, business organizations, trade unions, etc. Almost all sectors have commented on the code, and many made their comments in

great detail. Commission members are experts not only from Bohemia, but an equal number of members are from the Slovak Republic as well. They have been actively involved in the work from the beginning, so I can state that the Czech and Slovak colleagues are currently cooperating very well together. Both sides share this view.

HUNGARY

Bank Director Details New Mortgage Interest Law

91CH0334A Budapest TALLOZO in Hungarian No 2, 11 Jan 91 p 57

[Interview with Elemer Tertak, director of the National Savings Bank, by Peter Szakonyi; place and date not given: "OTP (National Savings Bank) Is Not Going To Give Advice; Instead, Listen to Uncle Dezsó"; article is reprinted from KURIR, 3 January 1991, page not given—first two paragraphs are TALLOZO introduction]

[Text] On the last working day of 1990, the parliament made a decision on the future of preferential construction credits. As is known, the infamous interest tax was last year declared illegal by the Constitutional Court and was subsequently annulled. But something had to be done about the loans of this type which amounted to several hundreds of billions of forints. Those who obtained construction loans before the end of 1988 at 0 to 3.5 percent interest will have to make a choice: They must either pay back half of the loan, following the original time table and paying an interest rate set by the market (the other half would be written off), or they must pay the entire sum at 15 percent interest.

However, this year will be transitional. Everyone's monthly installments will be increased by 1,500 forints. It is still open to question how we will choose between the alternatives. We asked National Savings Bank Director General Elemer Tertak about this.

[Tertak] As far as we are familiar with the bill that has been passed, it unequivocally makes it mandatory for us to notify the debtors about these alternatives. They have 30 days in which to make a decision. If they choose neither alternative, then the first variation automatically goes into effect, i.e., the preferential interest rate will be increased to 15 percent with an unchanged term of maturity. If the second variation is chosen, i.e., the repayment of half of the debt with an interest rate set by the market, a written statement to this effect must be submitted by a specified deadline to the financial institution. In that case, the December 1990 amount of the loan will be halved and the risk of always having to pay the given rate of interest will remain, of course.

[Szakonyi] What is the present rate?

[Tertak] The OTP [National Savings Bank] now charges 32 percent. We do not know yet how much the savings cooperatives are going to charge but it will probably be within this range. But I want to emphasize that this 32 percent is not the same as the interest rate to be introduced as of 1 January 1992, which after the year of transition will determine how much must be charged.

[Szakonyi] You no doubt have an idea as to which parties will choose variation one or variation two, i.e., to prepay or to pay the 15 percent interest. What advice do you offer to the debtors?

[Tertak] I would not give any advice because a good decision is affected by many factors: the amount of the debt, the family's financial situation, inflation, the changing interest rates, etc. Several of these may, and will, change. Everyone must decide and personally determine which is more advantageous.

[Szakonyi] I would hope that customers can get some advice at the OTP branches since not everyone is an expert financier.

[Tertak] I would like to avoid that. I have asked members of my staff not to offer advice if possible. The possibility of shortchanging the customer always exists in any case of advice, and then the bank will be blamed. They should instead discuss it with neighbor Uncle Dezso...

[Szakonyi] It seems that there is still a third alternative because the regulation that allows for a rebate, which is now 25 percent of the loan, in case repayment is made in one sum, is still in effect. Thus, someone who chooses variation two and then pays off the outstanding amount in cash will certainly come out ahead!

[Tertak] To the best of my knowledge, this latter alternative does not exist anymore, only the statute has not yet been made public. The regulation that made repayment with rebate possible was connected to low interest rates. Since the interest rates were increased to 15 percent as of 1 January, this loophole was unequivocally closed. On the other hand, the decrees are not adequately coordinated, and consequently it may happen that the draft bill to raise interest rates will be passed by parliament before the passing of the modification of the other draft bill.

[Szakonyi] Yes, but then for a few days, anyone who is watchful enough can take advantage of this loophole.

[Tertak] Yes, but I do not think that he can finish the game. If there is a discrepancy of a few days in making the statutes public, then we can say that although variation two does already exist, it has not been publicly announced, therefore it cannot be applied together with the other one. Incidentally, repayment with rebate applies only to the entire sum, not half of it.

While we cross our fingers for the shrewd ones, it must also be clear that in the final analysis, those who take

advantage of this loophole cause losses to the Republic of Hungary, i.e., to all of us, and we will somehow have to pay for it.

[Szakonyi] I think that even the additional monthly 1,500 forints which must be paid in 1991 are beyond the means of many people. What will happen if thousands, even tens of thousands are unable to pay?

[Tertak] Unfortunately, this possibility does exist. There are already people who do not make payments on time. Fortunately, the state has set up a 2-billion-forint fund for aiding those who are in need, and the allocation is up to the local governments. This fund will probably be insufficient for helping everyone in need, therefore, we and the local governments must look for other possibilities as well.

[Szakonyi] What will happen with the allocation of foreign currency? Many people stand in line today, concerned that they will not get their \$50, while others are afraid that foreign currency accounts will be frozen.

[Tertak] Entitled persons will get their quota of foreign currency without any limitation because the country has an adequate stock of foreign currency. I definitely doubt that foreign currency accounts will be frozen; this would have to be a last resort. The last time banks were closed in Hungary was in the early 1930's, but even then Hungary's bank system survived....

POLAND

Switch to Hard Currency in Trade With USSR *91EP0249B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (LAW AND ECONOMY supplement) in Polish 8 Jan 91 p 1*

[Interview with Wladyslaw L. Malkiewicz, chairman, Chamber of Commerce and Industry, by Andrzej Zielinski; place and date not given: "Without Rubles and Zlotys"]

[Text] [Zielinski] Mr. President, as of 1 January, accounting for trade between our countries is being calculated in convertible currency. Not everyone is happy with this.

[Malkiewicz] The move to accounting in hard currency is a healthy sign and, although it will at first bring painful problems to many enterprises, it will still free them from all unfavorable liabilities, permit demonopolization of activity, and make mutual trade ties more comfortable and effective.

We will not buy from Poland that which does not suit us and, in return, our Polish partners will take from the Soviet Union what is most needed. Buying for the sake of buying—because there was a bargain or spare funds—will end. Now no one will pay for what is of no use to him.

[Zielinski] Trade without rubles and zlotys in the first period will surely diminish markedly.

[Malkiewicz] One must take this phenomenon into consideration. Sales of goods between our countries will decrease. But that is normal and I see nothing wrong with it. The creation of the art of trade, not fulfilling allotted limits, will begin. We will also have to deal with reflecting the real needs of both parties.

According to my prognosis, at first a certain lull will be observed, and later a clear revitalization of trade. Neither our enterprises nor yours have an excess of spare hard currency. This shortage of theirs also has its good side. They will finally be able to rid themselves of all the unnecessary components that surrounded trade relations in the past. The revitalization that I expect will occur quickly; it will be an economically healthy revitalization and that, of course, is the point.

[Zielinski] One problem still remains to be solved. The Polish enterprises that have traded with the Soviet Union up to now have a lot of rubles, for which they have not been able to buy either goods or services. They really do not know what they are supposed to do with them.

[Malkiewicz] I will say immediately that this is also a problem for Soviet firms, many of whom have zlotys, korunas, or forints, for which they could buy needed goods. In a word, we are riding the same horse.

A mechanism to solve this difficult problem has not yet been worked out. In all countries where accounting in their own currency was required, sensible methods are being sought. It appears that making a complete evaluation of this situation is crucial, and it is necessary either to find a convertible currency factor acceptable to both sides, exchange these funds, or perhaps try to find another solution. But this problem will be most easily and quickly resolved at the level of enterprises cooperating with each other. Where it will depend on inventiveness and the ability to come to terms with a partner.

Internal Affairs Budget Allocation Discussed

91EP0253A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 17 Jan 91 p II

[Article by E.K.W.: "Money for the Police"]

[Text] After almost three hours of debate (including a segment without the participation of journalists), deputies from the Commission for Administration and Internal Affairs resolved on 16 January to conditionally adopt the draft budget of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for 1991. The deputies stated that "from last-year's controllers we have now become a parliamentary lobby supporting the ministry," stressing in unison that the proposed amount of 10,226 million zlotys is insufficient.

Among others, Minister Henryk Majewski said this, referring in particular to the outfitting and formation of the Border Guard which is being set up (including the

"sealing" of the neglected eastern border) and its tasks, for example, in fighting organized international common crime. He also recalled costs entailed by rebuilding intelligence and counterintelligence, the need for replacing as soon as possible technical equipment which is unfit for service, funds to maintain the expected wave of refugees which are even hard to estimate, and outlays associated with security for two visits by the Pope to our country this year.

While not questioning these and other needs, the deputies noted the lack of separating individual outlays in specific elements of the ministry. Such specifics would not only make plan outlays clearer, but would also ensure budgetary stability for individual services. For example, the police know that they will receive the highest amount for their needs, 7,368 billion zlotys (72 percent of the entire budget of the ministry). However, outlays associated with the Border Guard are entered in the draft law in combination with the Vistula Military Units and the Main Command of Fire Brigades (over 993 billion zlotys, or 9.8 percent).

Representatives of the ministry explained that all units have different needs, and the proposed separation of individual elements is unnecessary because the minister has the right to shift funds and provide additional financing for individual services if need be.

The deputies resolved to ask the government to ensure this year the necessary outlays associated with the visits by the Pope (it was not expressly stated in the debate whether the Office of the Council of Ministers or the Ministry of Internal Affairs will finance security for the visits), the needs of the Fire Brigades, and to develop a concept regulating the issue of refugees. They also resolved to prepare two requests for the prime minister concerning public security and the funds required for this purpose, and the allocation of additional funds for the Fire Brigades.

Voivodship Labor Market, Unemployment Statistics

91EP0253B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 8 Jan 91 pp I-II

[Article by Antoni Kowalik: "Predictions Are Still Pessimistic"]

[Text] Last year, more than 1,124,000 people registered as unemployed in employment offices throughout the country. They included 573,000 women and 164,000 graduates who are still looking for work after graduation. At the same time, there were about 54,000 vacant jobs as of the last day of December, mainly in large urban and industrial centers such as Warsaw, Katowice, Lodz, Szczecin, and Wroclaw. An overwhelming majority of these are job offers for men who can undertake manual labor as workers.

These statistics mean that after a year of changes in the economy, 6.1 percent of the gainfully employed population remains jobless; this statistic would be considerably higher, and would amount to 8.3 percent if we calculated it without the share of those employed in individual agriculture.

However, this average statistic does not describe the situation in the labor market which emerged in the course of last year in individual voivodships. The highest percentage of the unemployed in the overall gainfully employed population was registered in Suwalki Voivodship—11.5 percent, and in Olsztyn, Ciechanow, Jelenia Gora, and Koszalin Voivodships—over nine percent. Voivodships with the lowest levels include Warsaw—2.1 percent, Katowice and Krakow—3.4 percent, and consecutively Poznan, Opole, and Wroclaw. The more industrialized a region is, or the greater the administrative, commercial, etc. center is, the fewer problems there are with work. This regularity emerged in the first months of the occurrence of unemployment and will persist in the future.

The number of people who lost their jobs last year as a result of group layoffs at enterprises is relatively small and amounts to a total of 183,000.

The results of counteracting the growth of unemployment are also interesting, that is, the application of the following instruments in policies affecting the labor market: retraining, skill acquisition, professional training, emergency public works, and credit and loans for creating additional jobs or for undertaking economic operations. Statistics suggest that the effects of this policy did not substantially influence the scope of unemployment.

Thus, employment offices issued a total of 274,000 referrals to the unemployed on the basis of offers of employment filed by enterprises. Professional training was organized for about 100,000 people, mainly in large cities such as Warsaw, Lodz, Katowice, Krakow, Lublin, and Wroclaw.

There are also voivodships—Biala Podlaska, Ciechanow, and Przemysl—where even these measures were not taken, or the number of people retrained was also symbolic, for example, in Lomza—four people, in Zamosc—10 people, in Tarnobrzeg—22 people. This suggests that the employment offices most frequently organized retraining in response to specific needs of enterprises or offices, which simply did not occur in voivodships with the highest unemployment.

Emergency public-works employment was the most frequently used instrument of employment policy. A total of more than 406,000 people were referred to such work. The greatest numbers were referred in Katowice (over 12,000), Bydgoszcz (5,500), Lublin (4,500), Wroclaw (3,800), and Gorzow Voivodships (3,700).

A total of 28,700 loans were extended for creating additional jobs; 32,400 loans were granted to begin

economic operations. This form of activation of the unemployed developed in particular in the last month of last year. It is expected that it will be used increasingly.

A comparison of the growth of unemployment in individual months indicates that in the last quarter of last year the rate declined considerably. For example, there was no growth of unemployment at all in six voivodships—Legnica, Nowy Sacz, Ostroleka, Piotrkow, Rzeszow, and Zielona Gora—in December compared to November of last year. In other voivodships, this indicator fluctuated around one or two percent. There are nine such voivodships. Does this translate into better predictions for the labor market this year?

Perhaps, such a conclusion would be premature. There are still many potential sources of unemployment in the economy. It is still unknown how the number of the unemployed will be affected by changes in settlements with the CEMA countries, that is, trade with, for example, the USSR, privatization, bankruptcy proceedings, and the closing of unprofitable or environmentally unsafe enterprises. A lot will also depend on the employment policy and its effectiveness in creating new job opportunities.

(We publish a summary statement on unemployment entitled "Labor Market" on page II).

Labor Market

As of the end of last year, the number of the unemployed amounted to almost 1,125,000 people. Just over 50,000 jobs were available to them. Katowice, Lodz, Bydgoszcz, and Olsztyn Voivodships still have the greatest number of unemployed, and Chelm, Biala Podlaska, and Leszno have the fewest. About one-sixth of the unemployed lost their jobs in the course of group layoffs. Detailed data follow:

Voivodship	Number of Job Offers	Number of Unemployed
Total	53,854	1,124,753
Warsaw	12,141	26,888
Biala Podlaska	54	9,310
Bialystok	1,044	29,218
Bielsko Biala	1,147	17,454
Bydgoszcz	1,577	39,481
Chelm	296	7,922
Ciechanow	301	19,544
Czestochowa	540	21,452
Elblag	981	17,337
Gdansk	1,246	31,636
Gorzow Wielkopolski	804	21,248
Jelenia Gora	424	24,377
Kalisz	823	25,748

ECONOMIC

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Voivodship	Number of Job Offers	Number of Unemployed
Katowice	7,800	63,434
Kielce	768	39,483
Konin	469	20,636
Koszalin	494	22,974
Krakow	3,715	21,183
Krosno	139	18,941
Legnica	198	19,197
Leszno	397	9,407
Lublin	442	32,376
Lomza	144	16,384
Lodz	2,957	47,646
Nowy Sacz	344	20,788
Olsztyn	483	34,912
Opole	880	19,214
Ostroleka	139	15,548
Pila	313	16,225
Piotrkow Trybunalski	830	27,325
Plock	228	22,929

Voivodship	Number of Job Offers	Number of Unemployed
Poznan	1,924	21,207
Przemysl	136	17,385
Radom	2,593	23,172
Rzeszow	248	24,337
Siedlce	255	15,569
Sieradz	111	14,029
Skiernewice	396	13,354
Slupsk	847	16,836
Suwalki	272	25,129
Szczecin	1,256	20,914
Tarnobrzeg	747	19,676
Tarnow	196	18,057
Torun	354	28,054
Walbrzych	414	28,044
Wloclawek	304	15,766
Wroclaw	1,855	23,474
Zamosc	75	15,218
Zielona Gora	646	24,320

POLAND

Statistics on Eastern Churches Presented

91EP0247C Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
(ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish
17 Jan 91 p II

[Article by M.Z.: "Catholic Church in Poland: Eastern Rites"]

[Text] Alongside the faithful of the Latin rite, the Catholic Church in Poland also includes faithful from rites derived from the eastern traditions of Christianity: the Greek Catholic, Uniate, and Armenian rites.

The Uniate Church at the moment has only one parish. It is in Kostomloty near Kodnio and has approximately 300 faithful and one priest.

The Armenian Church has a parish in Gliwice and two pastoral centers in Gdansk and Krakow. It is overseen by Kazimierz Filipiak, the Polish Primate's Vicar General for the Armenian Rite. There is only one other Armenian priest besides Father Filipiak, and the number of Armenian Rite believers totals under 15,000.

For the Greek Catholic Church, World War II proved to be a form of censorship and criticism spurred by organizational breakdown, regional unity, and the impact of theological formation, and, as a result, the diminishment of institutions and the dispersal of the faithful all over

the world. During the Second Republic, this was a period when this church enjoyed the greatest activity in its history. It was a community with about 4 million faithful, 3,000 parishes, and 2,500 priests.

The Greek Catholics in presentday Poland are living in diaspora, given the geographic reality of the 1947 resettlement of the Ukrainian population. There are between 80,000 and 100,000 Greek Catholic faithful in each of the three areas of concentration, Lower Silesia, Pomerania, and the Mazovia. There are between 10,000 and 20,000 Greek Catholics residing in Eastern Malopolska, in areas which have historically been Greek Catholic. The church's regional structure has been adapted to this diaspora situation. In 1981 two vicariates were established, a northern one and a southern one. The present vicars general are Basilian Jozafat Romanyk in Northern Poland and Father Jan Martyniak in Southern Poland. Father Martyniak, who is in residence in Legnica, was named a suffragan bishop in 1989.

In 1989 the Greek Catholic Church had 61 active priests, some of them Basilians. The Basilian First Order, or male branch, presently has 23 religious in two communities, one in Warsaw and the other in Wegorzewo. The congregations of women religious, with ministries in a dozen or so localities, include 19 Basilian Sisters, 87 Oblates, and 34 Josephites.

This church does not have an independent system of formation. Candidates to the priesthood receive their formation at the Warsaw Metropolitan Seminary and the Theological Seminary in Lublin.

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